Chapter One: On the states of the rational soul from the aspect of its relation to the natural world, this has six sections.
Section One: On the mode of the connection of the soul to the body
Know that the connection of one thing to another and the need of one thing for another is different according to their potential. According to their potential, the difference is divided into a few types.
The first type is the strongest and most intense of connections, this is the connection according to the essence and the meaning both in the mind (dhihn) and in external reality (khārij).
The second type is the connection according to the self and reality, meaning that the self (dhāt) of something and its identity (hūwīyyah) become connected to the connected self and identity like connection of the contingent to the necessary.
The third type is the connection according to the self and characteristic together, this type of connection to the self of the characteristic is an accidental (ʿaraḍ) to the subject (mawḍūʿ), like the connection of the color black to a body.
The fourth type is regarding existence and individuation (tashakhkhuṣ), in terms of origination (ḥudūth) and subsistence (baqā’). Meaning that the existence and individuation of a thing is attached in origination and subsistence to nature and characteristic, like the attachment of form (ṣūrah) to matter (māddah). This is because form, for its individuation, needs matter, not in its essence, but in one respect usually. This is such as the relation of the ceiling, which is the pillars, in terms of them being changed, and not in its own essence. Also, such as the need of the natural body (jism ṭabīʿī) for a place (makān) in its existence from the aspect of contingency, not in its own essence. Thus, it is easy for a natural body to move from one place to another.
The fifth type regarding existence and individuation, in origination and not in subsistence, such as the connection of the soul (nafs) to the body. This is because the soul, in the beginnings of its creation and origination, falls under the ruling of natural aquatic things, which is obscured in existence (mubhamat al-wujūd) due to matter and in need and want. Thus, the soul is attached to the bodily matter which is obscured in existence. This is because the identity of the body changes due to transmutation, transformations, and succession (talāḥuq) of quantities (maqādīr). So, the human person, although is one person from his own identity, but regarding his corporeality (jismīyyah), meaning matter or the subject, he is not one person. Moreover, it has been established in the discussion on motion (ḥarakah) that the subject of momentum (ḥarakah kammīyyah) is a type of characteristic, in relation to corporeality and is an individual in relation to nature and the soul.
The sixth type is the connection regarding completion (istikmāl) and acquisition (iktisāb) of a virtue (faḍīlah) for existence, not regarding the basis of existence (aṣl al-wujūd), such as the connection of the soul to the body in the view of most of the philosophers absolutely. Also, such as the connection of the soul to the body after reaching formal maturity (bulūgh ṣūwarī) which happens when the soul gains the power to ponder and have practical wisdom (ʿaql ʿamalī) actualized (bil fiʿl), before it has theoretical rationality from potentiality (qūwwah) to actuality, as is the chosen view of the teacher of the teachers, the leader of the wise men (ḥukamā’) and the theosophists. Also, this is the weakest of the connections mentioned before, just as the connection of the manufacturer (ṣāniʿ) to the tool (ālah). However, the difference is that the connection of the completion of the soul with the material tools is a natural (ṭabīʿī) and essential (dhātī) connection, and the connection of a manufacturer, such as a carpenter (najjār) to the tool, is an accidental and external connection. This is because the souls (nufūs), in the beginnings of their creation, are devoid (khālī) of existential perfections (kamālāt) and attributes (ṣifāt), be it from the animalistic (ḥayawānīyyah) aspect generally or the human (insānīyyah) aspect particularly. Furthermore, they do not acquire perfections except by using tools, and it is necessary that those tools be different. Some may be from the type of movements (ḥarakāt), some form perceptions (idrākāt). Of those from movements, some are of the animalistic type, such as desire (shahwah), and some are from anger (ghaḍab).[1] Of those that are from perceptions, some are from touching (lams), some are from smelling, some are from tasting, some are from viewing, and some are from hearing. If the tools of the soul would not be different, all acts and perceptions would be gathered in the soul, and the perceptions would be confused amongst themselves, and then no perception out of these mentioned would be gained by the soul in a complete and perfect manner. Moreover, it is apparent that the forms of things are gained for the soul firstly by the common sense (ḥiss mushtarak), secondly in the imagination (khayāl), and thirdly in the theoretical intellect (ʿaql naẓarī). This is the reason it is said:
من فقد حسا فقد علما
The one who loses his senses loses knowledge.
Nothing in the sensible things is such that in its single existence for its own self gathers all the attributes and sensible modalities (kayfīyāt maḥsūsah). This is because what is seen is other than what is heard, and the scent is other than the taste. Thus, it is necessary that the perception of these modalities and the feeling of these perfections be different, due to the difference of the existence of things in the intellect. This is because it is possible for one thing to be in the intellect, in relation to the one intellectual existence of scent, taste, smell, sound, color, warmth, coldness and other attributes in the most perfect, lofty, and noblest form,
كما بيّنه الفيلسوف في كتابه
As has been explained by the philosopher in his book.
Hence, it is proven that it is necessary that perception of sensible things as they are sensible is with different tools so that the soul’s perceptions may not be jumbled and not be mixed for the soul. This is because it has been proven that the tools and perceptions of the soul are different. Thus, we say that when the soul wants to hear, it attends towards the ear and can hear completely. Similar is the case for all other actions with the other faculties. Also, since these actions are constantly proceeding from the soul, with the aid of the previously mentioned tools, the soul obtains an ability and capability to obtain these actions without the aid of any of the previously mentioned tools. Rather, whenever it wishes, it can summon these actions and control them in their own essence if it so wishes. After this exposition (taqrīr), it is known that the soul, at the inception of its creation, is devoid of all formal perfections, of sensory, imaginal, or rational form such as prime matter. After this, it reaches a stage where it becomes the agent[2] (faʿāl) of immaterial forms from matter, whether those immaterial forms be particular or universal. It is imperative that those immaterial forms mentioned before shall be the noblest and highest from the generated (kā’inah) and corrupted (fāsidah) forms. Thus, the statement of the one who asserts that the soul, from its initial connection to the body to its subsistence, is like a substance (jawhar) and essence (dhāt) of one thing, is a weak (ḍa’īf) and absurd (sakhīf). The reason is because it is known that the soul, in its initial being, is nothing at all (lā shay maḥaḍ). Therefore, it has come in the divine scripture (ṣaḥīfah ilāhīyyah):
هَلْ أَتَىٰ عَلَى الْإِنسَانِ حِينٌ مِّنَ الدَّهْرِ لَمْ يَكُن شَيْئًا مَّذْكُورًا ﴿الانسان: ١﴾
Has there not come a period upon man when he was not something worth mentioning. [76:1].
Also, at the time of completion, it reaches the rank of the active intellect (ʿaql-i-faʿāl).[3] Moreover, if it is said that it is definitively proven that the soul is the first perfection for the natural body and the form of both things is one in essence and different in mental consideration (iʿtibār), then how is it decided that the soul is devoid of all forms in the beginning of its existence, inception and natural predisposition (fiṭrah)? We say that form is of two types. One is the material form whose existence identical to a divided reality (amr munqasim), one that occupies space (mutaḥayyiz) and has dimensions (jihah). Its unity is the same as its acceptance (qabūl) of multiplicity, and its stability (thabāt) is actualized renewal (tajaddud) and expiration (inqiḍā’). Its action is the same as the power of things
فكونها صورة مصحوب بكونها مادة
So, it’s being a form is accompanied by it being material.[4]
The second type is an immaterial form, whether it is conditional with the existence of matter in a certain state such as the relation of the tool of that form or unconditional. This second type itself is suitable to be called “form” because the first type has a weak unity and is weak in existence. It is due to that that is has no perceptional existence (wujūd idrākī) and is not sensed, imagined, or comprehended in external reality. As for the second type, for the form of which perceptional existence is a form without matter, then that form is either sensed, imagined, or comprehended. Thus, now it has been proven and established that what we have mentioned is apparent, that the soul, in the beginning of its existence, inception and natural predisposition is not something from the formal things, and neither is there obtained for it anything from the sensory, imaginal, or rational forms. This is because the existence of one thing for another is derived (mutafarriʿ) based on the other thing
بنحو ذلك الوجود إن خارجا فخارجا وإن حسيا فحسيا وإن خياليا فخياليا وإن عقلا فعقلا
In the manner of that existence. If it is external, then (it is derived) externally, if it is sensory, then sensually, if it is imaginal, then imaginably, if it is rational, then rationally.[5]
Therefore, in the beginning of its existence, inception, natural predisposition and at the time of its origination, the soul is the end of the material forms and the beginning of the perceptual forms. Moreover, the existence of the soul at the time of its origination is the last of the corporeal shells (qushūr) and the first of the spiritual extracts (rubūb rūḥānīyyah).
[1] This is an indication towards the power that humans possess, which are four in number. The first the animalistic power of lust (القوة الشهوية), the second is the power of anger (القوة الغضبية), the third is the power of intelligence (القوة العقلية) and the fourth is the power of imagination (القوة الوهمية). All these powers help humans function and live a complete life if utilized properly. Certain reports from the Imāms mention similar spirits found in man, see: Baṣāʾir al-Darajāt, pp. 466 – 474, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 272 & vol. 2, pp. 282 – 284, al-ʿItiqādat by al-Ṣadūq, p. 50, Tuḥaf al-ʿUqūl, pp. 189 – 191 and other sources. The reports of the Imāms categorize the types of souls into five: the holy spirit (الروح القدس), the spirit of faith (روح الإيمان), the spirit of desire (روح الشهوة), the spirit of strength (روح القوة), each of which have their own tasks. Some reports mention the spirit of the body (روح البدن) instead of the spirit of life (روح الحياة). A similar differentiation can be found in Plato’s Timaeus, especially in 69 a – 70 e.
[2] An agent in philosophy is the performer or doer of an act, which is why I have translated the word فعال here as agent.
[3] The active or agent intellect (العقل الفعال) is the last in the hierarchical series (السلسلة الطولية) in the arc of descent (القوس النزولي) from God to the corporeal realm. The active intellect is the direct cause of the material cosmos.
[4] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, vol. 8, p. 329.
[5] Ibid, p. 330.
باب اول در احوال نفس ناطقه من حيث نسبتها الى عالم الطبعية و در آن شش فصل است فصل اول در کيفيت تعلق نفس ببدن بدانکه تعلق شي بشي و حاجت شي بشي ديگر متفاوت است بحسب القوة پس باعتبار تفاوت بحسب القوة منقسم بچند قسم مي شود قسم اول که اقواي تعلقات و اشد تعلقات است تعلق است بحسب الماهية و المعني ذهنا و خارجا مثل تعلق ماهية بوجود قسم ثاني تعلق است بحسب الذات و الحقيقة باين معني که ذات شي و هوية شي متعلق بذات متعلق به و هوية به مثل تعلق ممکن بواجب قسم ثالث تعلق بحسب الذات و النوعية جميعا بذات متعلق به و نوعية متعلق به و آن تعلق عرض است بموضوع مثل تعلق سواد بجسم قسم رابع تعلق است بحسب الوجود و التشخص حدوثا و بقاءا باين معني که وجود تشخص شيء در حدوث و بقاء متعلق شود بطبيعة متعلق به و نوعية متعلق به مثل تعلق صورت بماده زيرا که صورت در تشخص خود محتاج است بماده لا بعينها بل بواحدة منها بالعموم مثل تعلق سقف که مستحفظ است بدعات ما على سبيل البدل بيکي ازآن دعامات لا بعينها و مثل حاجت جسم طبيعي در وجود خود بسوي مکاني از امکنه لا بعينها و لهذا سهل است حرکت جسم طبيعي از هر يکي از امکنه بسوي مکان ديگر قسم خامس تعلق است بحسب الوجود و التشخص حدوثا لا بقاءًا مثل تعلق نفس ببدن زيرا که نفس در اوايل تکون و حدوث حکمش حکم طبايع ماديه است که بماده مبهمة الوجود محتاج و مفتقر مي باشد پس نفس نيز بماده بدنيه مبهمه الوجود متعلق مي شود چرا که هوية بدن بتوارد استحالات و تلاحق مقادير متبدل مي شود پس شخصي انساني اگر چه باعتبار هوية نفسية خود شخص واحد است وليکن باعتبار جسمية بمعني ماده يا موضوع واحد بالشخص نيست و در بحث حرکت محقق شده است که موضوع حرکت کميه امر نوعي است بحسب جسمية و شخصي است بحسب الطبيعة و النفس قسم سادس تعلق است بحسب استکمال و اکتساب فضيلة براي وجود لا بحسب اصل الوجود مثل تعلق نفس ببدن عند الجمهور من الفلاسفة مطلقا و مثل تعلق نفس ببدن بعد بلوغ صوري که بوقت گرديدن آن نفس ذات قوة متفکره و عقل عملي بالفعل قبل از انکه عقل نظري آن از قوة بفعل آمده باشد کما هو مختار اوستاد الاساتذه صدور الحکماء و المتالهين و اين اضعف تعلقات مذکوره است. مثل صانع بآله مگر فرق اين است که تعلق استکمال نفس بآلات بدنيه تعلق طبيعي ذاتي است و تعلق صانع مثل بخار بآله تعلق عرضي خارجي است زيرا که نفوس در مبادي تکون خود از کمالات و صفات وجوديه خالي هستند خواه بحسب الحيوانيه مطلقا يا بحسب الانسانيۀ خاصۀ و تحصيل کمالات نميکنند مگر بحسب استعمال آلات و واجب است که آن آلات مختلف باشند بعضي از قسم حرکات و بعضي از قسم ادراکات و آنچه از قسم حرکات باشند بعضي از ايشان بحسب الحيوانيۀ از باب شهوۀ مي باشند و بعضي از باب غضب و آنچه از قسم ادراکات باشند بعضي از ايشان از باب لمس مي باشند و بعضي از باب شم و بعضي از باب ذوق و بعضي از باب ابصار و بعضي از باب سماع و اگر آلات نفس مختلف نباشند البته جميع افعال و ادراکات بر نفس مجتمع خواهند شد و بعض ادراکات يا بعض مختلط خواهد شد و يکي از ادراکات مذکوره برسبيل تمام و کمال براي نفس حاصل نشود و نيز واضح است که صور اشياء حاصل مي شوند براي نفس اولا در حس مشترک و ثانيا در خيال و ثالثا در عقل نظري از همين جاءَست که گفته مي شود من فقد حسا فقد علما و چيزي از محسوسات باين درجه نيست که بحسب وجود واحد لذاته جامع جميع صفات و کيفيات محسوسه بوده باشد زيرا که مبصر غير مسموع است و رائحه غير طعم است پس واجب است که مدارک اين کيفيات و مشاعر اين کمالات مختلف باشند بخلاف وجود اشياء در عقل که جايز است بودن شيء واحد در عقل باعتبار وجود واحد عقلي شم و ذوق ورائحه و صوت ولون و حرارت و برودت و غير ذالک من الصفات بر وجه اتم و اعلى و اشرف کما بينه الفيلسوف في کتابه پس ثابت شد که واجب است ادراک محسوسات بما هي محسوسات بآلات مختلفه تا ادراکات نفس متشوش و بر نفس مختلط نشوند چون ثابت شد که آلات ادراکات نفس مختلف هستند پس ميگويم که نفس بر وقت قصد ابصار متجوه چشم مي شود پس قادر مي شود بر ابصار تام و بر وقت قصد سماع متوجه اذن مي شود قادر مي شود بر سماع تام و علي هذا القياس در سائر افعال بسائر قواي و چون اين افعال از نفس مکرر صادر مي شوند باستعانۀ آلات مذکوره حاصل مي شود براي نفس ملکه و اقتدار بر تحصيل اين افعال بدون استعانه بچيزي از آلات مذکوره بلکه هر وقت که خواسته باشد استحضار آن افعال نموده تصرف ميکند در آنها بذاتها چنانچه مي خواهد پس از تقرير مذکور معلوم شد که نفس در اول تکون خود مثل هيولي اولى از جميع کمالات صوريه و صورت محسوسه يا متخيله يا معقوله خالي است و بعد از آن بدرجه ميرسد که فعال صور مجرده از مواد مي شود عام از اينکه آن صور مجرده جزئيه باشند يا کليه و لا محاله صور مجرده مزبوره اشرف و اعلى مي باشند از صور کائنه فاسده پس قول آن کسيکه زعم نموده است که نفس از اول تعلق خود ببدن تا آخر بقاي آن بحسب جوهر و ذات خود شيء واحد است سخت ضعيف و سخيف است زيرا که معلوم شد که نفس در اول کون لا شيء محض است چنانچه در صحيفه الهيه وارد شده است هل اتى على الانسان حين من الدهر لم يکن شيئا مذکورا و در وقت استکمال بمرتبه عقل فعال ميرسد و اگر گفته شود که تحقيق ثابت شده است که نفس کمال اول است براي جسم طبيعي و کمال و صورت هر دو شيء واحدند بالذات و متغاير اند بالاعتبار پس چه طور حکم کرده شده است که نفس در اول کون و بد و فطرت از جميع صور معرا است ميگويم که صورت بر دو قسم است يکي صورت ماديه که وجود آن عين وجود امر منقسم متحيز ذي جهۀ است و وحدت آن عين قبول کثرت است و ثبات آن عين تجدد و انقضا است و فعل آن عين قوۀ اشياء است فکونها صورۃ مصحوب بکونها مادۃ ديگري صورت غير ماديه خواه مشروط باشد بوجود ماده بر وضع خاص نسبت بآله آن صورت يا مشروط نباشد و همين قسم ثاني لايق است که مسمى شود باسم صورت زيرا که قسم اول ضيعفۃ الوحدت و ضعيفۃ الوجود است و از اين جهۀ است که وجود ادراکي ندارد و بوجود خارجي خود محسوس و متخيل و معقول نمي شود اما قسم ثاني که از براي آن صورۀ وجود ادراکي صوري است بلا ماده پس آنصورت يا محسوسه است يا متخيله يا معقوله. پس چون ثابت و متحقق شد آنچه ما ذکر کرديم ظاهر گرديد که نفس در اول کون و بدو فطرت چيزي از اشياء صوريه نيست و نه از بري او چيزي از صور حسيه يا خياليه يا عقليه حاصل ميشود زيرا که وجود شيء براي شيء ديگر متفرع است بر وجود آن شيء ديگر بنحو ذالک الوجود ان خارجا فخارجا و ان حسيا فحسيا و ان خياليا فخياليا و ان عقليا فعقليا پس نفس در اول کون و بد و فطرت و حين حدوث نهايت صور ماديات است و بدايۀ صور ادراکيات و وجود و نفس در حين حدوث آخر قشور جسمانيه است و اول ربوب روحانيه.