Section Six: The rational soul is a matter that is separated rationally
You must know that the cause of the souls cannot be the body, otherwise each body would be as such. Moreover, it is not possible that the corporeal potentiality be the cause of the soul since the corporeal potentiality in its own existence will either need the body or it would not need it. Rather, in its own influence and both options, it is impossible. So, the influence of the potentiality in the existence of the soul is impossible. Now, since we have presupposed the influencer, this goes against the premise. As for the first option, it is invalid due to numerous reasons.
The first reason is that the corporeal form, when it acts in something, its act will be with the partnership of the acceptor (qābil). The acceptor is a body, and the body being a partial influencer is impossible, as has been established in its own place.
The second reason is that the corporeal form is an influencer via the state, since the condition of the state is inside the sustainer of its corporeal existence and obtaining the state in relation to something that does not have a state is impossible.
The third reason is that the cause is more complete and stronger than its effect, and the corporeal existence is weaker in existence than the immaterial existence. This is because its existence is subsisting through matter, and the existence of the immaterial is needless of matter. So, it is impossible that the influencer in the soul would need the body in existence.
As for the invalidity of the second option, then it is because that thing which is needs a body to have an influence and be active is something for which the body is an intermediary tool between it and its effect. Also, making the body an intermediary is inconceivable except from the aspect of the state and quantity. This is because the corporeality of a body is due to the state and quantity. So, that body would surely have a differing relation to that thing it has an influence on based on its proximity and remoteness, and according to proximity and remoteness its influence would also vary. So, its influence on something is based on whether the thing is proximate to it in a certain kind of proximity. This is because if its influence were not based on proximity and its influence would not be different due to the differences of grades of proximity, it is necessary that its influence in proximity would be like its influence in remoteness. So, that body would really have no influence in it since the existence of the body and the type of individuality of the body is with a particular state. So, if the influence in proximity is before the influence in remoteness, it is necessary that it would be an act for which proximity and remoteness is possible. So, it would not be something immaterial and spiritual. Thus, whatever acts by partnership with and via a body is something that has a state and would reflect the image of its opposite. Also, it is impossible that a thing which does not have a state is an intermediary of the body. The soul is not something that has a state, so it is not possible that it exists by the mediation of the body. So, the actor of the soul is necessary to have activity in its own essence and be needless of matter. So, the actor of the rational soul is a holy thing separate from matter and the attachments of matter, whether it be a form or another soul. That immaterial thing is called the active intellect by the philosophers and according to the first philosophers of Persia it was known as the psyche-giver (rawān bakhsh) in their language (bilughatihim). It being called an intellect is because it is an immaterial form that is comprehended (maʿqūl) for itself by itself. This is because whatever is free of matter must be rational (ʿāqil) for its own self, and its intellect for itself is the same as the existence of its own self, not the presence of another form. So, its own self is an intellect, it is rational and comprehended. It being called “active” is due to three reasons. The first is that it is the producer of our rational souls as well as what takes them out from the limit of the intellect in potentiality to the limit of the intellect in actualization. The second reason is that it is actualized from all aspects, and there is no potentiality in it. It is the totality of all rationally comprehended matters, rather, all existent things due to its rational existence. So, the usage of the word “active” is due to an exaggeration of its actualization. Thus, based on this, every intellect is active (since they are all actualized). The third reason is that it is the producer of this world and the starting point of the diffused forms on its matters. As for the exposition of the matter that this thing is not the deity of this world or the necessary being, then it is that it is the last of the immaterial intellects in which is the blending of multiplicity. However, the exalted created is truly one, at the peak of greatness and magnanimity. However, the souls are many. If it is said that why is it not possible that some of the souls be the cause of others, such as the soul of the father in the soul of the child. We say that the influence of the soul in something is due to the partnership in state. So, the soul does not have an influence in something that has no state. This is the first reply from the replies of al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs in his book al-Mubāḥathāt that has has mentioned. His reply is that the souls are united in type, so if we say that one soul is the cause of the existence of another soul, then that cause would either be one or multiple. So, if the cause is one, it would be either ascertained or unascertained. The first possibility, meaning the cause being ascertained, is impossible because one of the things united in type is not more entitles to being the cause than the other without the opposite. As for the second possibility, meaning that the cause is unascertained, then it is also impossible because the ascertained effect summons an ascertained cause. As for if the cause is multiple, then it is also impossible because a certain number of souls is not more entitled to being the cause than a certain number of other souls. Thus, it is necessary that the influencer of one soul be that of all immaterial souls, and this is impossible because a lesser amount than the total has been obtained in our time is independent in influencing in a manner that the totality which is prior to our time is less than this totality and is sufficient in influencing. Now, when some individuals of the totality would be sufficient then that totality would not be an influencer due to the impossibility of succession (tawārud) of two independent causes on one effect. So, the causality of the soul due to the totality of the previous souls or due to some of them is not possible. Thus, the reliance (istinād) of the existence of the soul on one of the individuals of the soul is impossible. This is what we wanted to prove.[1] This is the summary of al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs’s argument, may Allāh sanctify his secret, and the reason for the priority of the first answer mentioned out of the answers of this Shaykh is because the argument of the Shaykh is based on the unity of the souls in essence. Now, for the souls, as we shall soon explain, the reason for their firmness in talents and angelic or satanic morals or animalistic and predatory characteristics is due to the variation in types, despite them being united in type in their first origination point and the simplicity of their essences which can accept forms and sciences. So, if some souls, after coming out of potentiality towards actualization, would be the cause of other souls, the issue mentioned above would not be entailed.
[1] The term used in philosophical discourse for this is what was sought (المطلوب), like how we have “quod erat demonstrandum” or Q.E.D in short from Latin at the end of an argument, which means “Which was to be demonstrated.” Such argumentation forms are called the Burhān al-Munfaṣil (البرهان المنفصل), in which many options are presupposed and by demonstrating that the other options are false you established the sought-after option (المطلوب) as being true. This is opposed to a Burhān al-Khulf (برهان الخلف) which is known as demonstration by contradiction, like a reductio ad absurdum argument.
فصل سادس
در اينکه سبب نفس ناطق امر مفارق عقلي است بايد دانست که علت نفوس جايز نيست که جسم باشد و الا هر جسم چنين باشد و نيز جايز نيست که قوّۀ جسمانيه علت نفوس باشد زيرا که قوّۀ جسمانيه در وجود خود محتاج جسم خواهد بود يا در وجود محتاج آن نباشد بلکه در تاثير خود و هر دو شق ممتنع است پس تاثير قوت در وجود نفس ممتنع است و حالانکه موثر فرض شده است و اين خلاف فرض است اما بطلان شق اول بچند وجوه است وجه اول اينکه صورت جسمانيه چون فعل نمايد در چيزي فعل آن بمشارکت قابل خواهد بود و قابل جسم است و بودن جسم جزو موثر ممتنع است چنانچه بجاي خود تحقيق شده است وجه ثاني اينکه صورت جسمانيّه موثر است بواسطه وضع زيرا که حيثيت وضع داخل است و در قوام وجود جسمي آن و حصول وضع نسبت بغير ذي وضع ممتنع است وجه ثالث اينکه علت اتم و اقوى است از معلول و جسماني اضعف است در وجود از مجرد زيرا که وجود او قايم است بماده و وجود مجرد مستغني است از ماده پس ممتنع است که موثر در نفس محتاج باشد بسوي جسم در وجود و اما بطلان شق ثاني پس باينکه آن چيزي که در تاثير و فاعليّت خود محتاج بجسم است آن است که جسم در فعل آن آله متوسط است درميان آن و معلول آن و توسيط جسم متصوّر نيست مگر از جهت وضع و مقدار زيرا که جسميّت جسم بوضع و مقدار است پس لا محاله نسبت آن جسم بقرب و بعد بسوي آن چيزيکه در آن تاثير مي نمايد مختلف ميشود و بحسب قرب و بعد تاثير او هم مختلف مي شود پس تاثير او در چيزي موقوف است بر اينکه آن شيء قريب آن باشد بنحوي از قرب زيرا که اگر تاثير او موقوف بر قرب نباشد و نيز تاثير او بتفاوت درجات قرب متفاوت نباشد واجب است که تاثير او در قريب مثل تاثير او در بعيد باشد پس آن جسم را دخلي در تاثير نباشد زيرا که وجود و نحو تشخص جسم بوضع خاص است پس اگر تاثير در قريب قبل از تاثير در بعيد باشد واجب است که بوده باشد آن فعل از انکه قرب و بعد بر آن صحيح باشد پس امر مجرد روحاني نخواهد بود پس هر چه بمشارکت جسم بواسطه جسم فعل نمايد پس آن چيز ذو وضع است و بعکس نقيض منعکس مي شود باينکه آن چيزيکه ذو وضع نباشد ممتنع است که بواسطه جسم باشد و نفس ذو وضع نيست پس ممکن نيست که بواسطه جسم موجود باشد پس فاعل نفس واجب است که در ذات خود در فاعليت خود غني باشد از ماده پس فاعل نفس ناطقه امر قدسي مفارق از ماده و علايق ماده است خواه صورت باشد يا نفس ديگر و آن امر مفارق مسمّى است بعقل فعال عند الحکماء و عند الاوائل و حکماء فرض مسمّى است بردان بخش بلغتهم و وجه تسميه او بعقل اين است که آن صورت مجرده است که معقول است براي ذات خود بذاته زيرا که هر چه مجرد از ماده باشد بايد که عاقل باشد مرذات خود را و عقل او ذات خود را نفس وجود ذات او است نه حضور صورت ديگر پس ذات او عقل است و عاقل است و معقول است و وجه تسميه او بفعّال بسبب وجوه ثلاثه است وجه اول آنکه موجد نفوس ناطقه ما است و مخرج آنها است از حد عقل بالقوّۀ بسوي حد عقل بالفعل و وجه ثاني اينکه بالفعل است من جميع الوجوه چيزي بالقوۀ در آن نيست و آن کل معقولات است بلکه کل موجودات است بوجود عقلي آنها پس اطلاق فعال از روي مبالغه در فعليّه است پس بنابر اين هر عقل فعّال است و وجه ثالث اينکه آن موجد اين عالم است و مبداء صور فايضه است بر مواد آنها و اما بيان اينکه آن امر اله عالم واجب الوجود نيست پس اين است که آن آخر مفارقات عقليه است که در آن شوب کثرت است و باري تعالى واحد حق است در غايت عظمت و جلالت و نفوس کثيره اند و اگر گفته شود که چرا جايز نيست که بعض نفوس علت بعض ديگر باشند مثل نفس والد در نفس مولود مي گوئيم که تاثير نفس در چيزي بمشارکت وضع است پس نفس در غير ذي وضع تاثير ندارد و اين جواب اولى است از جواب شيخ رئيس که در کتاب مباحثات ذکر کرده است و آن اين است که نفوس متحد بالنوع اند پس اگر ما نفسي را علت وجود نفس ديگر قرار بدهيم آن علت واحد خواهد بود يا کثير پس اگر واحد باشد معين خواهد بود يا غير معين و اول يعني معين بودن آن محال است زيرا که احد المتفقين در نوع اولى نيست که علت باشد براي ديگري بدون عکس و ثاني يعني غير معين بودن علت نيز محال است زيرا که معلول معين مستدعي علت معينه است و اما اگر علت کثير باشد پس آن هم باطل است زيرا که عددي از نفوس اولى از عدد ديگر نيست پس واجب است که موثر در نفس واحد جميع نفوس مفارقه باشند و اين محال است زيرا که اقل از مجموع که در زمان ما حاصل است مستقل است در تاثير بجهت اينکه مجموعيکه قبل از زمان ماست اقل است از اين مجموع و کافي است در تاثير و چون بعض احاد مجموع کافي باشند پس آن مجموع موثر نباشد به سبب امتناع توارد علتين مستقلين بر معلول واحد پس تعليل نفس بمجموع نفوس سابقه يا ببعض احاد آنها ممکن نيست پس استناد وجود نفس بسوي چيزي از احاد نفس ممتنع است وهو المطلوب اين است حاصل حجت شيخ رئيس قدس سرّه و وجه اولويت جواب مذکور از جواب شيخ اين است که حجت شيخ مبتني است بر اتحاذ نفوس در ماهيت و نفوس چنانکه عنقريب بيان خواهد شد بسبب رسوخ ملکات آنها و اخلاق ملکيه يا شيطانيه يا بهيميه با سبعيه آنها مخالفه الانواع اند اگر چه در اول نشآءَت خود و سزاجت ذوات خود که قابل هيهات و علوم اند متحد بالنوع باشند پس اگر بعض نفوس بعد از خروج آنها از قوت بسوي فعل علت بعض ديگر باشند محذور مذکور لازم نمي آيد باب ثاني در ابطال تناسخ نفوس و ارواح و دفع متمسکات اصحاب تناسخ و در آن سه فصل است.