Section Two: On investigating the origination (ḥudūth) of the soul with the origination of the body for the rational and insightful person
It should not remain hidden that the previous discussion is enough to prove that souls are originated with the origination of bodies.[1] This is because it is apparent that souls are renewed in existence and transform in their states from the lowest ranks of substance to the highest ranks of substance. If the souls in their own selves were everlasting (azalī) and eternal (qadīm), while being perfect in substance in their natural predisposition and essence, then deficiency (naqṣ) and lack (quṣūr) would not attach to them. Moreover, if they were not essentially deficient in existence (nāqiṣat al-wujūd), they would not be in need and want of vegetative (nabātīyyah) and animalistic (ḥayawānīyyah) tools and powers. Furthermore, if they were eternal then the type (naw’) of souls would be based on one person and in the realm of creation (ʿālam al-ibdā’) it would not be subject to division (inqisām) and multiplicity (takaththur). This is because the division and multiplicity of individuals with the existence of qualitative unity (ittiḥād naw’ī) from the specific bodies and material corporeality and that whose existence is not due to preparation (istiʿdād), motion, matter, and agitation (infiʿāl). Thus, it is necessary that its type is based on one person and the human souls (nufūs basharīyyah) in this realm have multiplicity in number and are united in their type. The exposition of this will soon follow. Thus, the belief that the souls precede the bodies, let alone the saying that they are eternal, is completely invalid. It should also be known that it is quoted from some of the ancient philosopher such as Plato (d. 347 BCE) and others that they believed in the eternity of the human souls. The confirmation of this belief is from the famous ḥadīth:
كنت نبيا وآدم بين الماء والطين
“I was a prophet when Adam (as) was between water and clay.”[2]
Moreover, another ḥadīth narrated from His Eminence, peace and blessings be upon him and his progeny:
الأرواح جنود مجندة فما تعارف منها ائتلف وما تناكر منها اختلف
“Souls are like recruited troops. Those who familiarize with each other develop affinity, and those who remain unfamiliar differ.”[3]
Furthermore, the Prophet (ṣ) said:
خلق الله الأرواح قبل الأجساد بألفي عام
“Allāh created the souls two thousand years before the bodies.”[4]
If the meaning of these reports is that the human souls, in relation to these partial entifications (taʿayyunāt juz’īyyah), were present before the bodies, the previously mentioned impossibilities will be necessitated. Additionally, it is necessitated that the powers of the soul will be suspended (muʿaṭṭal) in their actions, because the reality of the soul in its being a soul is nothing except the form attached to regulation of the body. Due to this form, there are powers and perceptions, some of which are animalistic, and others are vegetative. Thus, what is meant by the priority (taqaddum) of souls is the priority of those souls (arwāḥ) with which the rational human souls (nufūs) connect, as well as those immaterial and active intellects and celestial souls. This is the type from which we have the ḥadīth:
أول ما حلق الله عقلي
“The first thing God created was my intellect.”[5]
And the ḥadīth:
أول ما خلق الله روحي
“The first thing God created was my spirit.”[6]
In this is an indication towards the meaning that the rank of the first intellect is the same as the rank of the Holy Prophetic Soul, peace and blessings be upon him. Also, the view of the researching mystics is thus that the active intellect refers to the Holy Prophetic Soul. Thus, the ḥadīth:
أول ما خلق الله العقل
“The first thing God created was the intellect.”[7]
And the ḥadīth:
أول ما خلق الله القلم
“The first thing God created was the pen.”[8]
And the ḥadīth:
أول ما حلق الله عقلي
“The first thing God created was my intellect.”[9]
And the ḥadīth:
أول ما خلق الله نوري
“The first thing God created was my light.”[10]
Point to the same thing. Similar are the aḥādīth that have come on the priority of the souls of the Prophets and the intimate friends of God (awlīyā’), may allāh send his blessings on all of them. This is the exposition of Fāḍil Lāhījī in the book Gawhar-i-Murād, and the truth is that for the souls, existence and being is different. That which is in the divine depositories are the immaterial rational forms before the creation of souls and the bodies of souls and the realities of the existence of things. They are in the noblest and highest form in the divine depositories than their existence in the realm of contingency (ʿālam al-imkān) and the abode of realms. This is what is meant by the Platonic Forms (muthul aflāṭūnīyyah) which Plato proved and called the lords of types (arbāb al-anwā’)[11] and posited as the regulating lights (anwār mudabbirah). The meaning of this matter, in short, is that for the complete souls of the human type, there are different realms and types of existences. Some of these realms are before nature, and some are near nature, and some are after nature
على ما عرّفه الراسخون في الحكمة المتعالية
Based on what has been declared by those firm in the transcendental philosophy.[12]
This foundation is established on the stronger and weaker in substance and on the occurrence of intensifying motion (ḥarakah ishtidādīyyah) in material substance, as well as on the investigation of principles and goals (ghāyāt). This is because the ending of things is the same as the beginning of things. Thus, the meaning of the eternity of souls, as has been quoted from Godly Plato (aflāṭūn-i-ilāhī), and the meaning of the souls being prior (to bodies) as has been derived from reports and aḥādīth is immaterial rational existence of souls in the depositories of divine knowledge from the immaterial rational forms. It is prior to the relational existence of the souls; this has been expressed as its existence before nature. Thus, for external particulars both existence and fixation (thubūt) are true in the rigidity of the divine decree. Those external particulars at that place are safe and secure from change (taghayyur), erasing (maḥw) and fixation (ithbāt). Also, in the start of the relationality and the relational existence in generation and corruption (kawn wa fasād), erasing and fixating they are occurring. Therefore, both realms have been pointed to in the divine scripture, meaning, the immaterial rational realms and the natural relational realms, in the statement of the exalted:
يَمْحُو اللَّهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُثْبِتُ وَعِندَهُ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ ﴿الرعد: ٣٩﴾
Allāh erases what he wills or fixates it, and with him is the mother of the book. [13:39].
The depository of divine knowledge which is called the active intellect is safe from changes and transformations as well as erasure and fixation. Therefore, they have called it the preserved tablet (lawḥ maḥfūẓ). Thus, the godly philosopher Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, may Allāh elevate his rank, states in Dār al-Karāmah and Risālat al-ʿIlm:
إن إدراكه تعالى للمعلومات البعيدة بارتسام صورها في معلولاته القريبة وهي حاضرة عنده تعالى بجميع الصور وهي التي يعبر عنها تارة بالكتاب المبين وتارة باللوح المحفوظ ويسميها الحكماء بالعقول الفعالة
His, may He be exalted, perception of faraway known things is due to manifestation (irtisām) of its images in his proximate effects which are present near him, may He be exalted, with all their forms. They are at times called the manifest book, at other times the preserved tablet, and the philosophers call them the active intellects.[13]
Moreover, the teacher of the teachers, the leader of the philosophers and theosophists in Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfī, in proving various realms, meaning the immaterial rational realm which is called the existence before nature, and the material relational realm, which is an existence near nature, states regarding this:
ان للارواح البشرية من لدن حصولها فى علم اللّه ومكامن غيبه وصلب قضائه وقدره الى حين بروزها من بطون الملكوت الى ظهور الشهادة، اكوانا متعددة بعضها اعلى من بعض وارفع وانور واشد جمعية وبساطة واجمالا، وبعضها ادنى وانزل واقل نورا واكثر تفرقة وتفصيلا وتركيبا، وليس ما نسب الى الحكماء الاولين كافلاطن الالهى ومن يحذو حذوه ويسلك سبيله من السلاك الالهيين: ان الارواح قبل الابدان او انها قديمة معناه: ان هذه النفوس البشرية بنحو وجودها الجزئية وهوياتها المتكثرة الشخصية وتعيناتها النفسانية كانت موجودة قبل الابدان فى عالم القدس. هيهات! هذا مما لا يمكن ان يذهب إليه حكيم فاضل لما دل عليه قواطع البراهين، ثم ان الّذي وجوده الوجود العقلى التام المجرد عن النقائص والشرور والافات ما الّذي سنح له، حتى اضطره والجأه الى مفارقة ذلك العالم عالم القدس والنور والطهارة والنزول فى مهاوى الجهال والارذال، ومعدن الشرور والظلمات ودار الاموات والجمادات ومعرض الآلام والاحزان والبليات؟ بل مراد اولئك الحكماء الاساطين من تقدم الارواح على الاشباح، تقدم نشأتها العقلية وطورها القضائية ووجودها العلوى السماوى فى مكمن سر الغيب قبل الشهادة وصلب القضاء قبل رحم القدر وعالم الامر قبل عالم الخلق، فان لها اطوارا كونية ونشئات وجودية بعضها ما قبل الطبيعة كعالم العناية والاسماء والقضاء والقدر والسماء، وبعضها ما بعد الطبيعة كنشأة القبر و البرزخ والبعث والحشر والعرض والجنة والنار. والى الاول الاشارة فى قول النبي: كنت نبيا وآدم بين الماء والطين، وكذا فى قوله تعالى: الَّذِي يَراكَ حِينَ تَقُومُ وَتَقَلُّبَكَ فِي السَّاجِدِينَ (الشعراء- 219)، تلويح إليه والى الثانى قوله تعالى: وَنُنْشِئَكُمْ فِي ما لا تَعْلَمُونَ (الواقعة- 61)، وقوله: يا أَيُّهَا الْإِنْسانُ إِنَّكَ كادِحٌ إِلى رَبِّكَ كَدْحاً فَمُلاقِيهِ (الانشقاق- 6). ففى الآيات والاخبار دلالة على ان للنفوس البشرية اطوارا واكوانا لاحقة كما لها اكوان سابقة، وقد بينا جميع ذلك بالبراهين والحجج فى تآليفنا وصحفنا واوضحنا دليلها وكشفنا عن وجه سبيلها، وبذلك يندفع التناقض فى اقوال الحكماء وتحصيل التوافق بين كلمات ارباب الشرائع حيث ينقل عن بعضهم القول بقدم الروح وكونه غير مخلوق ولا واقع تحت ذل الكون وعن بعضهم القول بحدوثه وكونه مكونا من الجسم مخلوقا من الهواء، وعلى ما حققنا يحمل قوله تعالى: وَإِذْ أَخَذَ رَبُّكَ مِنْ بَنِي آدَمَ مِنْ ظُهُورِهِمْ ذُرِّيَّتَهُمْ (الاعراف- 173) … الآية.
Surely, the human souls, at the time of their obtaining in the knowledge of Allāh and the hiding places of his unseen, the rigidity of his decree and divine will, until it appears from the interiors of the heavenly dominion (malakūt) to the manifestation of the witnessed. Multiple realms, some of which are above others, as well as being loftier, more luminous, and stronger in inclusivity, simplicity, and totality. Some are lower and inferior, less luminous, and more dispersed, detailed and more composite. It is not true what has been attributed to the first philosophers such as Godly Plato and whoever followed him and treaded his path from the godly wayfarers that the souls are before the bodies, or that they are eternal, meaning that these human souls, in terms of their particular existence and multiplicity of personal identities and personal levels were present before the bodies in the realm of holiness (ʿālam al-quds). How far! This is one of the things not possible for a virtuous philosopher to believe, due to the conclusive demonstrations present against it. Then, that whose existence is rational (ʿaqlī) which is complete and free of defects, evils, and blemishes, what would happen to it that it would be compelled to depart from that realm, the realm of holiness, light and purity and come down to the abysses of ignorant and lowly people, and the source of evils and darknesses, the abode of the dead and lifeless things, and the exhibition of pains, sorrows and trials? Rather, the meaning of those great philosophers in believing in the priority of spirit (arwāḥ) over specters (ashbāḥ) means the priority of their rational original, their completion phase, and their elevated heavenly existence in the hideaway of the secret of the unseen before being apparent, and the loin of the decree before the womb of fate, and the realm of command before the realm of the creation. This is because they (the spirits) have existential phases and ontological beginnings, some of which are prior to nature, like the realm of care, the names, the decree, fate, and the sky. Some of them are after nature, like the origin of the grave, the purgatory (barzakh), resurrection, gathering, being presented, heaven and hell. The Prophet’s statement is an indication towards the first one, when he says, “I was a prophet when Adam was between water and clay.” Similar is His, may He be exalted, statement “the one who sees you when you rise up and your movement among the prostrators.” [26:218-219]. He also says, “O mankind, you are exerting a great effort towards your Lord and will meet Him.” [84:6]. So, in the verses and reports is an indication that the human souls have phases and realms which are attached, as they have previous realms. We have already explained all of this in our writings with demonstrations and proofs, and we have clarified and explained its evidence and have uncovered the direction of its way. By this, the contradiction in the statements of the philosophers is driven away and a harmony is attained between the statements of the people of the divine laws. This is because some of them have been quoted as believing in the eternity of the soul and its being uncreated and not occurring under the shade of creation. Some of them have also been quoted as believing in the origination and constitution of the soul from the body, created from air. Based on our investigation, His statement, may He be exalted, “and when your Lord took from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants…” [7:172].[14]
Since you know that the human souls are in different realms and existences. Some are before nature; some are near nature, and some are after nature. Thus, what the philosophers mean who believe in the eternity of the souls or the priority of the souls before the bodies is the immaterial rational existence of the souls, which is in the same case higher, nobler, loftier, and more luminous than the natural relational realm. Thus, the teacher of the teachers, the leader of the philosophers and theosophists, in the quoted passage, said the same thing. This is the same meaning regarding the priority of souls that is derived from aḥādīth, it does not mean that the human souls were present in these partial levels before the bodies, since this is the view of the people of reincarnation. This was a concise exposition of the meanings of these aḥādīth and the meaning of Plato and other people’s view. We will, by the praise of Allāh, blessed and exalted, explain the details of this issue in a more complete and perfect manner in the following section, meaning Section Three of this chapter, from the statements of the Commander of the Faithful ʿAlī (as) and the statements of the philosophers, especially the statements of Plato and others who believed in the eternity of the souls. This will be done so that it may be clear to every rational and insightful person that what they meant by the priority or eternity of the souls was the immaterial rational existence of the souls before their natural relational existence. It is not the case that Plato and others meant that the human souls were existent in these particular essence before the bodies.
بعون الله تعالى وحسن توفيقه فانتظر ثمة
With the aid of Allāh, the exalted, and his good rectification, so wait till then.
As for Aristotle and his followers from the Peripatetics (mashāīʾīn), then they agree with the origination of these souls. This is one of the matters disagreed over between these two philosophers, namely Plato and Aristotle. We have, regarding the eternity and origination of the souls, tried to justify both views so that they may be united, just as we pointed towards it. At this place, we shall mention the arguments of both sides. So, the follows of the school of Plato argued for it with three arguments. The first argument is that for every originated thing, it is necessary that it has a particular matter (māddah mukhaṣṣaṣah) by having its own aptitude, it becomes a cause for the precedence of existence of an originated thing after non-existence. Thus, based on this, if souls were originated, they would surely later be material. What follows, meaning the materiality of the souls, becomes invalid. Thus, premise of the origination of the souls also becomes invalid since invalidity of the entailment necessitates the invalidity of the premise.[15]
The second argument is that if the souls were originated, their origination will surely be due to the origination of the bodies. However, previous bodies are unlimited (in number). Therefore, the previous bodies which are counter to them are also unlimited. Moreover, the souls, by consensus, after leaving the bodies, remain, and will be unlimited after leaving the body. However, the existence of unlimited souls existing together in actuality is impossible due to them accepting increase and decrease. However, everything that accepts increase or decrease is limited. Thus, it is proven that souls existing are actually limited. Thus, the origination of the bodies is not a cause for the origination of the souls. Also, the origination of the souls from their immaterial causes is not based on the origination of the body and the aptitude of matter. Hence, it is proven that the souls are eternal.
The third argument is that if the souls were originated, they would be impermanent since everything that is generated (kāʾin) is also corrupted (fāsid), and whatever is endless (abadī) is beginningless (azalī). Also, it is proven by investigation that souls are endless, as it shall soon be mentioned. Thus, it is proven that souls are beginningless.
As for the reply to the first argument, then it is based on two aspects. The first aspect is the chosen view of the leader of the philosophers and theosophists, that souls are
جسمانية الحدوث روحانية البقاء
Corporeal in origination and spiritual in subsistence.
The investigation of this shall soon follow. The second aspect is the view of some people that the souls are originated with matter, not in matter, and the danger is that a time is entailed when they are originated in matter.
As for the reply to the second argument, it is that although the souls separated from the bodies are unlimited, but they are not arranged (murattab) nor are they according to a natural arrangement. The demonstration that shows the impossibility of being unlimited in number is when it is assumed that numbers are arranged and gathered, otherwise there is no proof established on their impossibility.
As for the reply to the third argument, then it is that the human soul, in its immaterial essence, is neither generated nor corrupted. As for its occurrence under the category of generation, then it is corrupted from that aspect since it is generated.
As for those who believe in the origination of the souls, from their arguments is that if the souls were present before the souls, either they are one or many. If they are one, either they multiple at the time of connecting to bodies, or they do not. Thus, one soul would be the soul of every body. Also, if there is one soul for all the bodies, what is known to one person would be known to all people, and what is unknown to one person would be unknown to all people, and this is impossible. Also, if at the time of attachment to the bodies they are multiple, then what is material is not capable of being divided (inqisām) or partition (tajziʾa). If the souls are multiple prior to the bodies, it is necessary that all of them be distinct from one another. Moreover, the distinction between them will either be due to essence or due to the entailments (lawāzim) of their essence or due to the accidental properties of their essence. As for the distinction based on the essence or the entailments, it is impossible. This is because human souls are united in type, and all individuals of one type will have the same essences and entailments. Thus, the occurrence of distinction between the individuals of one type due to essences and entailments is impossible. As for the attached accidental properties, then the origination of those accidents is due to matter and what is within matter. The matter of the soul is a body from an aspect, and before the body there is no matter. Since there is no matter before the body, the origination of different accidents before the body is impossible. Hence, it is proven that the existence of the soul before the body is impossible, neither based on the description of unity (of souls), nor on the description of multiplicity (of souls). Hence, the priority of souls is invalid. The author of Mukhallaṣ has presented some objections to this argument. The first objection is that it is possible that the souls are one before the bodies and become multiple when attaching to bodies, and that which has been said at this place is that whatever is unified and due to its unity is incapable of division and partition. Hence, its unity is conjoint (ittiṣālīyyah), and that thing whose unity is conjoint is a body (jism). However, the soul is neither a body nor bodily, it is not correct, since we accept that whichever things has conjoint unity is capable of division and partition. However, we do not accept that whatever is capable of division, its unity is conjoint, because the consequent does not necessitate the universal.[16] The second objection is that we accept that the souls were multiple before the bodies, however, how do they say that it is necessary for each of them to have specialty with a distinguishing attribute? This is because if distinction is due to specialty in a matter, that matter would also be distinct from itself, and its distinction with another would lead to circularity (dawr) or an infinite regress (tasalsul). The third objection is that we accept that the souls were multiple before the bodies and distinct with essential attributes due to the difference of souls in their type. The fourth objection is that we accept that the souls, with their own essentialities and elements, are not distinct due to the unity of their type. However, why is it not possible that they be distinct due to certain accidental properties. Also, that which they say about the origination of accidents is due to matter and the matter of the soul is the body, and before the body, there is no matter. Hence. We say that it is possible that the soul is attached to another body before being attached to this body ad infinitum. This claim does not discontinue until the disproving of reincarnation. Hence, the previously mentioned argument on the origination of the souls is based on the disproving of reincarnation. However, the philosophers who disprove reincarnation have based it on the origination of the souls. This is because the disprovers of reincarnation have said that the transfer (intiqāl) of the soul from the body to another body is possible, and this would mean there can be two souls for one body. This is because souls are not originated from immaterial starting points, but due to the aptitude of the body. Hence, when the body is originated due to its own aptitude, it is necessary that the immaterial starting points of the soul attached to it also originate. So, if a transferred and reincarnated soul also attaches to it, it is entails that there can be two souls gathered in one body. However, this is impossible. Therefore, the previously mentioned argument for disproving reincarnation is based on the origination of the souls, and the origination of the souls is based on disproving of reincarnation. Hence, this leads to circular reasoning. This is the very reason why the author of al-Muʿtabar, Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, due to perplexity and negligence of the ancient authorities (mutaqaddimīn), counted this among the great matters. The fifth objection is that we accept that souls do not reincarnate or transfer. However, why is it not possible that they be described with accidental properties before the bodies which cause them to be distinct from one another, and the occurrence of accidental properties due to an accident be due to another accident ad infinitum? The sixth objection is an opposition, which is that the distinction of the souls after the leaving the bodies is not due to the essence of the entailments of the essence. Rather, it is due to accidental properties. However, when souls of prime matter which do not attain anything from accidental properties leave the bodies, there are no accidental properties in them. However, it was their mere essence which was attached with various bodies before this. Hence, if this much is enough to cause a distinction, then it will be sufficient for them in terms of them being originated for them being attached to distinct bodies. The answer that al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs[17] gave to this objection is that although souls of prime matter do not attain perfections. However, each one of them is conscious of its particular identity, and other souls not having this consciousness is incorrect because the consciousness of a thing in and of itself is that very thing, as has been proven in the chapter on knowledge. If their consciousness is different, they will certainly be different in their essence. This disproves the basis of the argument. If this much is proven in gaining distinction, then why is it not possible to have this much in gaining distinction before attachment to bodies?
The reply to the various objections
As for the first objection, the reply is that if every essence that is singular, personal, and existent, is divided and multiple after unity, is it necessary that a part of it be opposed to its totality. This is because something, with something other than it, is not highlighting the other thing. Thus, this opposition in existence, if it is due to essence and the entailments of essence, meaning the origin point of the multiplicity of souls is the opposition of souls in essence. Hence, it entails that these parts are distinct, always, and not in a particular time as opposed to another. Hence, that which we presupposed was one from the affairs of the attachment with bodies before the attachment to the bodies, will be multiple after attachment to the bodies. Also, if there is no opposition of the souls in essence and the entailments of the essence, then the multiplicity of the souls after the agreement and unity of type with particularity and universality will be in quantity (miqdār). This is because if particularity and universality are not in relation to meaning (maʿnā) and concept (mafhūm), they will necessarily be in relation to significance and insignificance of quantity. Otherwise, one will not be more entitled to universality and the other to particularity. Moreover, whenever the parts of a thing will be from the particularities of its essence, that thing will be a quantity or have quantity. Hence, it entails that the soul is a quantity or has quantity, and this is invalid. Furthermore, if it is accepted that an immaterial essence, after unity, is divided with parts like the essence or different from the essence, then each one of its essences of those parts will be originated after attachment to the bodies. Hence, each one of the souls in terms of it being itself, will be originated, and this is what was sought (maṭlūb). What remains is the discussion on the issue is whether the ascertained souls with these substantial originated essences have immaterial and rational existence and being prior to bodily existence or not? This is because near completion with the intellect in actual existential being that is rational and immaterial is opposed to existence and being that is attached the human souls that are united in type. The investigation of this matter requires a resumption of the discussion in another form, and we shall, God willing, discuss this in detail in the next section. As we have pointed our earlier, everyone does not have the taste for the capacity of perceiving this methodology (mashrab), rather, most temperaments (ṭabāʿi) tend to be averse to it.
As for the reply to the second objection, then we say that the distinguisher is sometimes essentially distinct due to it, and an accident is common in it. This type of accidental occurrence (ʿurūḍ) is not in relation to existence. Rather, it is in relation to essence, just like the accidental occurrence of the differentia (faṣl) for the essence of the genus (jins). Also, like the accidental occurrence of existence and the individuation for the essence of the type. Thus, the distinction of a human from a horse, for example, is after both having commonality in being animals. The entailments of being animals is to be rational and being rational is one of the accidents of the essence of an animal, not from its essential traits. Hence, if the accidental occurrence of them with animals is with another differentia, then it entails either circular reasoning or infinite regress. However, accidental occurrence of differentia with the essence of genus in a container (ẓarf) of rational analysis (taḥlīl ʿaqlī), not in the container of external existence (wujūd khārijī), in which genus and differentia would be united in one existence. Hence, it entails that the distinction of the distinguishing differentia for the type, which is indicated from all other types, where the essence of the distinguishing genus will be based on the distinction of this type in and of itself firstly. This is because the differentia is the collector of the genus and is prior to the genus in existence and posterior to it in essence. This is like the state in between existence and essence, and this same state is in personal distinctions of individuals of one type. This is because individuation is in terms of existence, as is the chosen view (kamā hūwa al-mukhtār), and existence is prior to essence in external reality in terms of each other, in relation to priority and addition of existence to essence regarding conceptions (taṣawwurāt), as has been explained in its own place (kamā hūwa mubayyin fī mawḍiʿihi).
As for the reply to the third objection, it is that we shall soon explain that the human souls, in relation to the natural connection of existence before the emergence of their intellects in prime matter, from potentiality to actuality are united in their type. The demonstration established for this is that potentialities attached to bodies, generated, and corrupted, their type is not based on one individual due to limitation of their substance from completion, perfection and that any person of them is incapable of existing continually eternally, because corporeal potentials are limited in their actions and reactions.
As for the reply to the fourth objection, then it is that soon the invalidity of reincarnation shall be apparent, not in a manner where it is based on origination of the souls, but rather from the aspect of proving the goals.
As for the reply to the fifth objection, then it is that accidental properties that are competing in time, corresponding on one essence are impossible to occur on one essence. Rather, it is due to means (asbāb) returning to the acceptor (ʿāʾidah ilā al-qābil) from the aspect of capacitive motion (ḥarakat istiʿdādīyyah) in the acceptor, the likes of movements that are not attained in things other than corporeal matter. Moreover, before the bodies the human souls did not have corporeal aptitudes which would accept those successive attributes, that it may be said that the accidental occurrence of an attached accident (ʿāriḍ lāḥiq) is due to a previous accident, till no beginning.
As for the reply to the sixth objection, then it is that the souls of prime matter are distinct from one another with attained attachments (lawāḥiq ḥāṣilah) due to matter. This is because the ruling of souls corporeal in origination is like the ruling of forms and dispositions, which are multiple due to corporeal distinctions. After that ascertaining of each soul with a particular existence, and that is the awareness of the souls of themselves, and this ascertaining remains constant.
ثانيا مع ضرب من التجدد الوجودي فلا جرم يبقى الامتياز بينها دائما
Secondly, with a certain type of existential renewal, there is no doubt that there will always be a distinction between them.[18]
The conclusion of this discussion is that the distinction of individuals of one type will undoubtably be due to something external to essence or the entailments of the essence, and this is not found except from the accidents of matter. Hence, the multiplicity and distinction obtained and conceived in the souls which remain after the bodies is the same that was obtained as at the time of clothing (talabbus) of bodies. After that, the ruling will be accompanied due to the subsistence of the effect of distinction in souls, even if accordingly (wa law bil-tabʿ). As for souls before the bodies, it is not possible that they be distinct, neither in essence nor in accident. Rather, in relation to dependency (tabaʿīyyah). Moreover, it has been proven by investigation that before the realm of movements and the incidences, the accidental occurrence of a specialized external (mukhaṣṣaṣ khārijī) and distinguishing accident (mumayyiz ʿaraḍī) that is immaterial is not possible. So, after unity in their reality and essence, distinction in that realm is also impossible.
فهذا ما يمكن أن يتكلف في تقرير هذه الحجة.
So, this is what is possible to carry out in the exposition of this argument.[19]
The virtuous investigator Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī[20], may God elevate his rank, in this book Tajrīd, in proving the origination of the soul with the origination of the body, has explained the previous argument in these words:
وعلى قول الخصم: لو كانت أزليّة، لزم اجتماع الضّدّين. أو بطلان ما ثبت. أو ثبوت ما يمتنع.
And as for the saying of the opponent that if they were eternal, it would be a conjunction of contradictions, or the invalidity of what is proven, or the proving of what is impossible.[21]
The entailment is invalid, and the invalidity of the entailment necessitates the invalidity of the premise. As for the explanation of the entailment, then it is that the souls before the bodies were either one or multiple based on the first exposition. At the time of the attachment with the bodies they will remain in their unity or become multiple. If they remain in their unity, they will all necessarily be characterized in each body by a contradictory attribute. Meaning, it entails that one soul will be characterized in different bodies with contradictory attributes such as knowledge and ignorance, cowardice and courage, stinginess, and generosity. Hence, it entails the conjunction of contradictions[22], and this is the first matter. If it is said that the previously mentioned traits are different in addition (iḍāfa), then it is possible that a single soul be knowledgeable due to addition with the body of Zayd[23] and be ignorant in relation to ʿAmr, and similar is the case in all other traits. We say that the previously mentioned traits are essential traits of the soul, so it is not possible for essential traits to differ with addition. Hence, al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs Abū ʿAlī Sīnā, says in the third section of the fifth treatise from the sixth art of the physics of al-Shifāʾ:
ونحن نعلم أن النفس ليست واحدة في الأبدان كلها، ولو كانت واحدة وكثيرة بالإضافة لكانت عالمة فيها كلها أو جاهلة، ولما خفي على زيد ما في نفس عمرو، لأنّ الواحد المضاف إلى كثيرين يجوز أن يختلف بحسب الإضافة. وأما الأمور الموجودة له في ذاته فلا يختلف فيها، حتى إذا كان أب لأولاد كثيرين وهو شاب لم يكن شابا إلا بحسب الكل، إذ الشباب له في نفسه فيدخل في كل إضافة؛ وكذلك العلم والجهل والظن وما أشبه ذلك إنما تكون في ذات النفس وتدخل مع النفس في كل إضافة. انتهى
And we know that the soul is not one in all bodies. If it were one and many in addition, it would be knowledgeable in all of them or ignorant. Thus, something would not remain unknown to Zayd that was in the soul of ʿAmr, because one thing that is added to many is possible to different according to the addition. As for the existent matters for him in his essence, then they do not differ in them, even if he is a father with many children and is a youth, he is not a youth except in relation to the totality, since youthfulness for him is in himself. So, it is included in every addition. Similar is the case of knowledge, ignorance, and speculation and similar things to it, they only occur in the essence of the soul and enter with the soul in every addition. End quote.[24]
If the soul of the souls, at the time of attachment to bodies, would not remain in its unity, rather would be multiple, it would entail that they would be related (muqārin) in size and quantity. This is because the division of one existent in the direction of multiple existents without size and quantity is impossible. Thus, it entails that it will not be immaterial even though the immateriality of the soul is established. Hence, it would entail the invalidity of something established, and this is the second matter. Also, this agrees with what is mentioned in al-Shifāʾ by al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs. Moreover, based on the second exposition meaning that if before the connection with the bodies, the souls were multiple, it entails the multiplicity of one meaning in type without matter, and this is impossible. Thus, it would entail the affirming of that which is impossible, and this is the third matter. Also, if it is said that according to the statement of the opponent, meaning, the eternity of the cosmos, there would perhaps be a body before every other body ad infinitum, as is the belief of those who hold to reincarnation, then it entails the affirming of what is impossible. So, we say that the multiplicity of souls united in type with the multiplicity of bodies at a time is possible such that the existence of every individual of those souls is due to the aptitude of a body from amongst those bodies, be it one body or another before it. Thus, this individual would be originated and not eternal, because each of them is based on the aptitude of an originated. Thus, it would also necessarily be originated. If it is said that perhaps the existence of the soul is eternal in aptitude in the beginning, meaning that it be attached everlastingly with an eternal body, after which it transfers to these originated bodies, we say that the transferring of the soul from the body is after the corruption of the body (badan). Moreover, the corruption of an eternal body (jism) is impossible. Also, whenever the attachment is eternal, its dissipation (zawāl) is impossible. So, the transference would also be impossible. Thus, from the explanation which we have given. It is apparent that the objection of Mullā ʿAlī Qūshjī[25], the commentator of Tajrīd, in this place where this argument is based on some premises, is weak. Furthermore, the argument for the origination of the soul is based on disproving reincarnation, and disproving reincarnation is based on the origination of the souls. This would necessitate a circular reasoning. However, this is not a valid objection and is unrelated. This is because the considering the belief in reincarnation possible does not object to the argument for the origination of the soul, and the argument for the origination of the soul is not based on the invalidity of reincarnation, as is famous between the later scholars (mutaʾakhkhirīn), and all praise is to Allāh, Lord of the worlds.
[1] This is the view of the Sadrian school of Mullā Ṣadrā, since he held a belief which states that should are corporeal in origination and spiritual in subsistence (جسمانية الحدوث روحانية البقاء). One may refer to the four journies of Mullā Ṣadrā and his other works for details of this.
[2] Manāqib Ibn Shahr Āshūb, vol. 1, pp. 183 – 184. This wording has been called into question by certain traditionalists (محدثون), however a different version exists that has been seen as authentic. The report is found with the other wording in al-Ṭabrisī’s al-Iḥtijāj, vol. 2, p. 248 where it mentions نبئت وآدم بين الروح والجسد, I was a prophet when Adam (as) was between spirit and body. In Sunnī sources, we find this report as well, see: Muṣannaf Ibn Abī Shaybah, no. 36553, and it was authenticated by al-Albānī in Silsilat al-Aḥādīth al-Ṣaḥīḥah, no. 1856. Another report mentions a similar meaning wherein it states that إِنِّي عِنْدَ اللهِ فِي أُمِّ الْكِتَابِ لَخَاتَمُ النَّبِيِّينَ، وَإِنَّ آدَمَ لَمُنْجَدِلٌ فِي طِينَتِهِ “I was the seal of the Prophets with Allāh in the mother of the book while Adam (as) was still glittering in his clay.” See: Musnad Aḥmad, no. 17150 & 17163, Mustadrak al-Ḥākim, no. 4175 and other sources.
[3] al-Uṣūl al-Sittah ʿAshar, p. 68, Kitāb al-Mu’min, p. 39, al-Amālī by al-Ṣadūq, no. 232, al-ʿItiqādat by al-Ṣadūq, p. 48, ʿIlal al-Sharāʾi, vol. 1, p. 84, Man Lā Yaḥḍuruhu al-Faqīh, no. 5818, Mukhtaṣar Baṣāʾir al-Darajāt, p. 215, Miṣbāḥ al-Sharīʿah, pp. 156 – 157, al-Amālī by al-Ṭūsī, no. 1232, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, no. 3336, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, no. 2638 and many other sources. This report has been interpreted and explained by many mystics, philosophers, exegetes, ḥadīth scholars and so on in their own works.
[4] Maʿānī al-Akhbār, p. 108, Man Lā Yaḥḍuruhu al-Faqīh, no. 5761, Rijāl al-Kashshī, no. 741, al-Amālī by al-Mufīd, p. 114. Scholars such as al-Mufīd have rejected this report due to it being from the solitary reports (أخبار الآحاد). See: al-Masāʾil al-Sarawīyyah, p. 52.
[5] This wording is not to be found in the ḥadīth sources. However, a variant wording where it mentions أول ما خلق الله العقل, the first thing God created is the intellect, is found in certain sources. See: ʿAwālī al-Liʾālī, vol. 4, p. 99.
[6] Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 54, p. 309.
[7] ʿAwālī al-Liʾālī, vol. 4, p. 99. And there are other reports of a similar meaning on the intellect. See: al-Kāfī, vol. 1, p. 21.
[8] Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī, no. 2155 & 3319, as well as Sunan Abī Dāwūd, no. 4700. Also see: Tafsīr al-Qummī, vol. 2, p. 198. And for a Zaydī source, see Musnad Zayd b. ʿAlī, p. 409.
[9] This wording is not to be found in the ḥadīth sources. However, a variant wording where it mentions أول ما خلق الله العقل, the first thing God created is the intellect, is found in certain sources. See: ʿAwālī al-Liʾālī, vol. 4, p. 99.
[10] ʿAwālī al-Liʾālī, vol. 4, p. 99. The content of this report is found in many reports. See: Kashf al-Khafā’, vol. 1, pp. 265 – 266, although Sunnī scholars have rejected the attribution to ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s Muṣannaf for this report. See al-Nabī al-Aʿẓam (ṣ) wa wujūduhu al-Nūrī by Muslim al-Dawārī, pp. 47 – 120 for Shīʿī sources and the rest of the book for a collection of Sunnī reports on the Prophetic light.
[11] Every type (نوع) has its own Lord (رب) or provider, such as the tree which has the Lord of its type from which all the individuals of that type receive effusion. From the active intellect emanate intellects or angels in the linear series (السلسلة العرضية) as opposed to the hierarchical series (السلسلة الطولية), and these linear intellects that emanate from the active intellect are also angels that are lords of each of their respective types from which the individuals of that type are united and receive their effusion. This is proven by many ways, including the rule of the noblest possibility (قاعدة إمكان الأشرف).
[12] Transcendental Philosophy (الحكمة المتعالية) is the name of the philosophical school of Mullā Ṣadrā.
[13] Sharḥ Risālah Masʾalat al-ʿIlm, p. 28.
[14] Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfī by Mullā Ṣadrā, vol. 1, pp. 473 – 475.
[15] This is a logical principal, that if P entails Q, and Q is not true, then P is not true. This is because Q can only be true if P is true, and once we know that the entailment is false, we know that the cause of that entailment will also be false. This type of argument is called Modus tollens in logic. For example, if there is a burglary, the jewelry will be missing. Since the jewelry is not missing, there was no burglary.
[16] This is similar to saying that every messenger (رسول) is a prophet (نبي), but every prophet is not a messenger. One of them is true, but the opposite of this is not true since one is contained within the other, but the other is not contained in the first.
[17] One of the titles of the Islamic Philosopher and polymath Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037 CE) is al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs (الشيخ الرئيس).
[18] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, vol. 8, p. 340.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is one of the most famous Islamic philosopher and polymaths who lived during the Mongol invasions of Muslim lands.
[21] Tajrīd al-ʿItiqād, p. 157.
[22] A conjunction of contradictions (اجتماع الضدين / النقيضين) is impossible since it violates the law of non-contradiction. Hence, an essence cannot be a thing and its opposite at the same time, such as a married bachelor or a human existing and not existing at the same time.
[23] The example of names like Zayd and ʿAmr is common in Arabic as an example when discussing or mentioning a sentence or idea.
[24] Al-Nafs min Kitāb al-Shīfāʾ, p. 310.
[25] Qūshjī (d. 1474 CE) was a prominent Ottoman scholar who wrote on many things including exegesis, astronomy, jurisprudence and philosophy.
فصل ثاني
در تحقيق حدوث نفس بحدوث بدن بر شخص عاقل و بصير پوشيده نيست که کلام سابق کافي است در اثبات اينکه اين نفوس حادث هستند بحدوث ابدان زيرا که ظاهر شده است که نفوس متجددۀ الوجود مستحيلۀ الحالات اند از ادني مراتب جوهريۀ بسوي اعلى مراتب جوهريۀ و اگر في نفس ذاتها ازلي و قديم باشند البته فطرۀ و ذاتا کاملۀ الجوهر باشند پس نقص و قصور بايشان لاحق نشود و نيز اگر في ذاتها ناقصه الوجود نباشند مفتقر و محتاج بآلات و قواي نباتيه و حيوانيه نشوند و نيز اگر قديم باشند البته نوع نفوس منحصر در شخص واحد خواهد بود و در عالم ابداع انقسام و تکثر بايشان لاحق نشود زيرا که انقسام و تکثر افراد باوجود اتحاد نوعي از خواص اجسام و جسمانيات ماديه است و آنچه وجودش باستعداد و حرکت و ماده و انفعال نيست پس واجب است که نوع او منحصر در شخص واحد باشد و نفوس انسانيه در اين عالم متکثرۀ الاعداد متحدۀ النوع اند چنانچه عنقريب بيان آن خواهد شد پس قول بقبليۀ نفوس از ابدان فضلا ان تکون قديمۀ باطل محض است و بايد دانست که از بعض قدماء فلاسفه مثل افلاطون وغيره قول بقدم نفوس انسانيه منقول است و تائيد اين قول مي نمائد حديث مشهور کنت نبيا و آدم بين الماء و الطين و نيز حديث ديگر از آن حضرت صلى الله عليه و آله و سلم الارواح جنود مجندۃ فما تعارف منها ايتلف و ما تناکر منها اختلف و نيز قوله صلى الله عليه و آله و سلم خلق الله الارواح قبل الاجساد بالفى عام اگر مراد اين است که نفوس بشريه باعتبار همين تعينات خبريه قبل الابدان موجود بودند محالات مذکور لازم مي آيند و نيز لازم مي آيد که قواي نفوس از افاعيل خود معطل باشند زيرا که حقيقت نفس بما هي نفس نيست مگر صورت متعلقه بتدبير بدن که از براي آن صورت قواي و مدارک باشند بعضي از آن حيوانيه و بعضي نباتيه پس مراد از تقدم ارواح تقدم آن ارواح است که نفوس ناطقه انسانيه در مآل حال بآنها اتصال مي نمائيند و آن عقول مجرده فعال و نفوس فلکيه است و از اين قبيل است حديث اول ما خلق الله عقلي و حديث اول ما خلق الله روحي چه اشاره است باين معني که مرتبه عقل اول با مرتبه نفس مقدسه نبوي صلى الله عليه و آله و سلم بحسب مآل يکي است و مذهب محققين عرفاء همين است که مراد از عقل فعال نفس مقدسه نبوي است چنانچه حديث اول ما خلق الله العقل و حديث اول ما خلق الله القلم و حديث اول ما خلق الله عقلي و حديث اول ما خلق الله نوري بر آن دلالت دارند و هچنين است احاديثي که در باب تقدم ارواح انبياء و اوليا صلوات الله عليهم اجمعين وارد شده اند اين است تقرير فاضل لاهجي در کتاب گوهر مراد حق اين است که از براي نفوس وجود و کينونۀ ديگر است و آن در خزائن علم الهي است از صور مفارقه عقليه قبل از ايجاد نفوس و ابدان نفوس و کون و وجود حقايق اشيا در خزائن علم الهي اعلى و اشرف است از وجود آنها در عالم امکان و دار الاکوان و همين است مراد از مثل افلاطونيه که افلاطون اثبات آنها نموده و آنها را ارباب الانواع و انوار مدبره قرار داده بيان اين مطلب بروجه اجمال اينست که براي نفوس کامله نوع انسان اکوان مختلفه و اقسام وجودات اند بعض آن اکوان قبل الطبيعۀ و بعض آن اکوان عند الطبيعۀ و بعض آن اکوان ما بعد الطبيعۀ حلي ما عرفه الراسخون في الحکمۀ المتعاليۀ و اين مبني است بر ثبوت اشد و اضعف در جوهر و بر وقوع حرکت اشتداديه در جواهر ماديه و بر تحقيق مبادي و غايات زيرا که نهايات اشياء همان بدايات اشياء مي باشند پس مراد از قدم ارواح چنانچه منقول است از افلاطون الهي و مراد از قبليۀ ارواح چنانکه مستفاد و اخبار و احاديث است وجود عقلي تجردي ارواح است که در خزائن علم الهي از صور مفارقه عقليه است و مقدم است بر وجود تعليقي ارواح و معبر شده است بکون قبل الطبيعۀ چنانکه براي اشياي جزئيه خارجيه هم وجود و ثبوت است در صلب قضاي الهي و آن اشياي جزئيه خارجيه در آنجا از تغير و محو و اثبات محفوظ و مصون اند و در نشاء تعليقي و وجود تعليقي در کون و فساد محو اثبات واقع اند چنانچه در صحيفه الهيه اشاره بهر دو کون يعني کون عقلي تجردي و کون تعليقي طبعي شده است في قوله تعالى يمحو الله ما يشاء و يثبت و عنده ام الکتاب[1] ام الکتاب خزانه علم الهي است که عبارت از عقل فعال است که محفوظ است از تغيرات و تبدلات و محو و اثبات و از همين جهۀ آنرا بلوح محفوظ تعبير نموده اند چنانچه حکيم الهي محقق نصير الدين طوسي اعلى الله مقامه في دار الکرامه در رساله علم مي فرمائيند ان ادراکه تعالى المعلولات البعيدۀ بارتسام صورها في معلولاته القريبۀ وهي حاضرۀ عنده تعالى بجميع الصور و هي التي يعبر عنها تارۀ بالکتاب المبين و تارۀ باللوح للمحفوظ و يسميه الحکما بالعقول الفعالۀ و نيز استاذ الاساتذۀ صدر الحکماء المتالهين در شرح اصول کافي در اثبات اکوان مختلفۀ يعني کون عقلي تجردي که وجود ما قبل الطبيعۀ عبارت از ان است و کون تعليقي مادي که وجود عند الطبيعۀ مراد از ان است ميفرمايد ان للارواح البشريه من لدن حصولها في علم الله و مکان من غيبه و صلب قضائه قدره الى حين بروزها من بطون الملکوت الى ظهور الشهادۀ اکوانا متعددۀ بعضها اعلى من بعض و ارفع و انور و اشد جمعيۀ و بساطۀ و اجمالا و بعضها ادنى و انزل و اقل نورا و اکثر تفرقۀ و تفصيلا و ترکيبا و ليس ما نسب الى الحکماء الاولين کافلاطن الالهي و من يحذو حذو من السلاک الالهيين ان الارواح قبل الابدان اوانها قديمۀ ليس معناه ان هذه النفوس البشريۀ بنحو وجوداتها الجزئيۀ و هوياتها المتکثرۀ الشخصيۀ و تعيناتها النفسانيۀ کانت موجودۀ قبل االبدان في عالم القدس هيهات هذا مما لا يمکن ان يذهب اليه حکيم فاضل لما دل عليه قواطع البراهين ثم ان الذي وجوده الوجود العقلي التام المجرد عن النقائص و الشرور و الافات ما الذي سخ له حتى اضطره و الجاه الى مفارقۀ ذالک العالم عالم القدس و النور و الطهارۀ و النزول في مهاوي الجهال و الارذال و معدن الشرور و الظلمات و دار الاموات و الجمادات و معرض الالام و الاحزان و البليات بل مراد اولئک الحکماء الاساطين من تقدم الارواح على الاشباح تقدم نشاءاتها العقليۀو طورها القضائيۀ و وجودها العلوي السماوي في ممکن سره الغيب قبل الشهادۀ و صلب القضاء قبل وجود القدر و عالم الامر قبل عالم الخلق فان لها اطوار کونيۀ و نشاءَات وجوديۀ بعضها ما قبل الطبيعۀ کعالم العنايۀ و الاسماء و الفضاء و القدر و السماء و بعضها ما بعد الطبيعۀ کنشاءۀ القبر و البرزخ و البعث و الحشر و العرض و الجنۀ و النار و الى الاول الاشارۀ في قول النبي صلى الله عليه و آله و سلم کنت نبيا و آدم بين الماء و الطين و کذا في قوله تعالى الذي يراک حين تقوم و تقلبک في الساجدين[2] تلويح اليه و الى الثاني في قوله تعالى ننشئکم فيما لا تعلمون[3] و قوله تعالى يا ايها الانسان انک کادح الى ربک کدحا فملاقيه[4] ففي الآيات و الاخبار دلالۀ على ان للنفوس البشريۀ اطوارا و اکوانا لاحقۀ کما لها اکوان سابقۀ و قد بيناه جميع ذالک بالبراهين الساطعۀ و الحجج القاطعۀ في تواليفنا و صحفنا و او ضحنا دليلها و کشفنا عن وجه سبيلها و بذالک يندفع التناقض في اقوال الحکماء و يحصل التوافق بين کلمات ارباب الشرائع حيث ينقل عن بعضهم القول بقدم الروح و کونه غير مخلوق و لا واقع تحت ذل الکون و من بعضهم القول بحدوثه و کونه مکونا من الجسم مخلقا من الهواء و على ما حققنا يحمل قوله تعالى و اذ اخذ ربک من بني ادم من ظهورهم ذريتهم الايۃ[5] چون دانستي که نفوس بشريه اکوان و وجودات مختلفه دارند بعض آن قبل الطبيعۀ و بعض آن عند الطبيعۀ و بعض آن ما بعد الطبيعه پس مراد حکماء قائلين بقدم ارواح يا قبيله ارواح از ابدان کون عقلي تجردي ارواح است که في نفس الامر اعلى و اشرف و ارفع و انور است از کون تعليقي طبيعي چنانچه استاذ الاساتذه صدر الحکماء و المتالهين در عبارت منقوله تصريح بآن فرموده اند از همين است معنى قبيلۀ ارواح که از احاديث مستفاد ميشود نه اين است که نفوس بشريه باين تعينات جزئيه قبل الابدان موجود بودند چنانکه مذهب اهل تناسخ است اين است بيان اجمالي در معاني اين احاديث و مراد قول افلاطون وغيره و ما بحمد لله تبارک و تعالى تفصيل اين مطلب را بر وجه اتم و اکمل در فصل ما بعد يعني فصل ثالث از اين باب از کلمات امير المومنين علي عليه السلام و اقوال حکماء خصوصا اقوال افلاطون وغيره قائلين بقدم ارواح بيان خواهيم نمود تا بر هر عاقل بصير واضح شود که مراد شان از قبليته يا قدم ارواح کون تجردي عقلي ارواح است قبل از کون تعليقي طبيعي نه اين که مراد افلاطون وغيره اين است که ارواح بشريه باين تعينات جزئيه قبل الابدان موجود بودند بعون الله تعالى و حسن توفيقه فانتظر ثمه و اما ارسطاطاليس و اتباع او از مشائين پس متفق اند بر حدوث اين نفوس و اين مسئله يکي از مسايل مختلف فيها است ما بين اين هر دو حکيم افلاطون و ارسطاطاليس و ما در قدم نفوس و حدوث آنها بنحوي توجيه نموديم که مدعاي هر دو متحد باشد کما اشرنا اليه و در اين مقام حجج فريقين را بتفصيل بيان مي نمائيم پس اتباع مذهب افلاطون احتجاج نموده اند بر آن سه دليل اول اينکه هر چيزي که حادث شود لا بد است براي او اراده مخصصه که باستعداد خود سبب بشود براي اولويته وجود حادث بعد العدم پس بنابر اين اگر نفوس حادث باشند البته مادي خواهند بود و تالي يعني ماديۀ نفوس باطل است پس مقدم که حدوث نفوس است نيز باطل است زيرا که بطلان تالي مستلزم بطلان مقدم است. دليل ثاني اينکه نفوس اگر حادث باشند البته حدوث آنها بحدوث ابدان خواهد بود ليکن ابدان ماضيه غير متناهي اند پس نفوس ماضيه که در مقابل اند نيز غير متناهي اند و نفوس بالاتفاق بعد از مفارقت ابدان باقي مي باشند و آنها بعد از مفارقت ابدان غير متناهي خواهند بود و ليکن وجود نفوس غير متناهيه موجوده بالفعل معا محال است بسبب قبول آنها زيادۀ و نقصان را و حالانکه هر چه قابل زيادت و نقصان باشد متناهي است پس ثابت شد که نفوس موجوده بالفعل متناهي اند پس حدوث ابدان سبب از براي حدوث نفوس نيست و حدوث نفوس از علل مفارقه خود موقوف بر حدوث بدن و استعداد ماده نيست پس ثابت شد که نفوس قديم اند. دليل ثالث اينکه نفوس اگر حادث باشند غير دائمه خواهند بود زيرا که هر چه کائن است فاسد است و هر چه ابدي است ازلي است و تحقيق ثابت شده است که نفوس باقي ابدي هستند چنانچه عنقريب بيان خواهد شد پس ثابت شد که نفوس ازلي هستند. اما الجواب از دليل اول بر دو وجه است وجه اولى مختار استاذ الاساتذه صدر الحکماء و المتالهين است که نفوس جسمانيۀ الحدوث روحانيۀ البقا اند چنانچه عنقريب تحقيق آن خواهد آمد و وجه ثاني مذهب قوم است که نفوس حادث مع الماده اند نه في الماده و محذور وقتي لازم مي آيد که حادث في الماده باشند. اما جواب از دليل ثاني اين است که نفوس مفارقه از ابدان اگر چه غير متناهي اند ليکن مرتب نيستند نه بترتيب طبعي و برهان که بر استحاله لا متناهي في الاعداد دلالت ميکند وقتي جاري مي شود که اگر اعداد مرتب و مجتمع باشند و الا بر استحاله آن دليلي قائم نشده. اما جواب از دليل ثالث اين است که نفس انساني من حيث ذاتها المجرده نه کائن است و نه فاسد و اما از ان جهت که تحت کون واقع شده است پس از ان بجهۀ فاسد است چنانچه کائن است و اما ادله قائلين بحدوث نفوس پس از جمله آنها اين است که اگر نفوس قبل الابدان موجود باشند پس يا واحد خواهند بود يا کثير اگر واحد باشند پس يا بوقت تعلق بابدان متکثر مي شوند يا نمي باشد پس نفس واحد نفس هر بدن خواهد بود و اگر از براي جميع ابدان يک نفس باشد البته معلوم يک انسان همان معلوم جميع افراد انسان خواهد بود و مجهول انسان واحد مجهول جميع افراد انسان خواهد بود و اين محال است و اگر بوقت تعلق بابدان متکثر شوند پس آن چه مادي نيست قابل انقسام و تجزيه نيست و اگر نفوس قبل الابدان متکثر باشند پس ضرور است که هر يکي از ديگري ممتاز باشد و تمايز ما بين آنها يا بالماهيۀ خواهد بود يا بلوازم ماهيۀ شان يا بعوارض ماهيۀ شان اما تمايز بماهيۀ يا بلوازم محال است زيرا که نفوس انسانيه متحد بالنوع هستند و جميع افراد نوع واحد در جميع ذاتيات و لوازم مساوي مي باشند پس وقوع امتياز ما بين افراد نوع واحد بذاتيات و لوازم غير ممکن است و اما عوارض لاحقه پس حدوث آن عوارض بسبب ماده و ما في الماده مي شود و ماده نفس بوجه بدن است و قبل از بدن ماده نيست و چون قبل از بدن ماده نيست پس حدوث عوارض مختلفه قبل از بدن غير ممکن است پس ثابت شد که وجود نفس قبل از بدن ممتنع است لاعلى نعت الاتحاد و لا على نعت الکثرۀ پس تقدم نفوس باطل است و صاحب ملخص بر اين دليل بچند وجوه اعتراض نموده است وجه اول اينکه جائز است که نفوس قبل از ابدان واحد بودند و بوقت تعلق بابدان متکثر شوند و آنچه در اين مقام گفته شده است که هر چه واحد است و با وجود وحدت قابل انقسام و تجزيه است پس وحدت او اتصاليه است و آنچه وحدت او اتصاليه است جسم است و نفس نه جسم است و نه جسماني درست نيست زيرا که ما قبول داريم که هر چه وحدت او اتصاليه است قابل انقسام و تجزيه است و اين را قبول نداريم که هر چه قابل انقسام است پس وحدت او اتصاليه است زيرا که عکس موجبه کليه نيست. وجه ثاني اينکه ما قبول داريم که نفوس قبل الابدان متکثره باشند ليکن چرا مي گوئيم که لا بد است تخصص هر يکي از انها بصفۀ مميزه زيرا که اگر تميز بسبب اختصاص بامري باشد البته آن امر هم مميز از غير خود خواهد بود و تميز آن امر از غير مستلزم دور است يا تسلسل. وجه ثالث اينکه ما قبول داريم که نفوس قبل الابدان متکثره بوده باشند و متميز باشند بصفات ذاتيه به سبب اختلاف نفوس بالنوع. وجه رابع اينکه ما قبول داريم که نفوس بذاتيات و مقومات خود متميز نمي شوند به سبب اتحاد نوعي ليکن چرا جائز نيست که متميز باشند بچيزي از عوارض و آنچه مي گوئند که حدوث عوارض به سبب ماده است و ماده نفس بدن است و قبل از بدن ماده نيست پس ميگوئيم که جائز است که نفس متعلقه ببدن قبل البدن متعلق باشد ببدن ديگر لا الى نهايۀ و اين مطالبه منقطع نمي شود ديگر بابطال تناسخ پس حجۀ مذکوره در اثبات حدوث ارواح مبني است بر ابطال تناسخ ليکن حکماء مبطلين تناسخ ابطال تناسخ را بر حدوث ارواح مبني نموده اند زيرا که مبطلين تناسخ گفته اند که اگر انتقال نفس از بدن بسوي بدن ديگر جائز باشد البته براي بدن واحد دو نفس خواهند بود زيرا که نفوس از مبادي مفارقه حادث نمي شوند مگر به سبب استعداد بدن پس وقتيکه بدن باستعداد خود حادث شد ضرور است که از مبادي مفارقه نفس متعلقه بآن حادث شود پس اگر نفس منتقله مستنسخه نيز بآن متعلق شود لازم مي آيد که از براي بدن واحد دو نفس مجتمع شوند و آن محال است پس حجۀ مذکوره در ابطال تناسخ مبني است بر حدوث نفس و حدوث نفس مبني است بر ابطال تناسخ پس دور لازم مي آيد و از همين جهۀ است که صاحب معتبر ابو البرکات بغدادي اين را از ذهول و غفلت متقدمين در مثل اين مهم عظيم شمرده. وجه خامس اينکه ما قبول داريم که نفوس متناسخ و منتقل نمي شوند ليکن چرا جائز نيست که قبل الابدان موصوف باشند بعوارض که آن عوارض بعض را از بعض ديگر تميز دهند و عروض عارض به سبب عارض ديگر باشد لا الى نهايۀ. وجه سادس معارضه است و آن اين است که تمايز نفوس بعد از مفارقت ابدان بماهيۀ و لوازم ماهيۀ نيست بلکه بعوارض است ليکن نفوس هيولانيه که چيزي از عوارض کسب ننموده اند وقتي که مفارقت ابدان نمائند در آنها چيزي از عوارض نباشد مگر مجرد ذات آنها که قبل از آن متعلق بابدان متغائره بود پس اگر همين قدر در وقوع تمايز کافي باشد پس کافي خواهد بود بودن آنها بحيثيتي که حادث شود براي آنها تعلق بابدان متمايزه و آنچه شيخ رئيس از اين معارضه جواب داده است که اگر چه نفوس هيولانيه کسب کمالات ننمودند مگر هر يکي از آنها شعور بهويۀ خاصه خود دارد و نفوس ديگر اين شعور ندارند درست نيست زيرا که شعور شيء بذات خود نفس ذات شيء است على ما ثبت في باب العلم و اگر مختلف الشعور باشند البته مختلف بذات خواهند بود و اين مبطل اصل حجۀ است و اگر همين قدر در حصول امتياز ثابت است پس چرا جائز نيست حصول امتياز بهمين قدر قبل از تعلق ابدان. و جواب از اين وجوه اعتراض اما از وجه اول پس اين است که هر ذات واحده شخصيه موجوده اگر بعد وحدت منقسم و متکثر شود واجب است که جزو آن مخالف کل باشد زيرا که شيء با غير خود بعينه آن شيء لا مع الغير نيست پس اين مخالفت در وجود اگر بماهيۀ و لوازم ماهيۀ است يعني منشاء تعدد نفوس تخالف نفوس است بماهيۀ پس لازم مي آيد که اين اجزاء متمايز باشند دائما لافي وقت دون وقت پس آنچه را از امور متعلقه بابدان قبل از تعلق بابدان واحد فرض کرديم بعد از تعلق بابدان متکثره باشند و اگر مخالفت نفوس بماهيۀ و لوازم ماهيۀ نيست پس تعدد نفوس بعد اتفاق و اتحاد نوعي بجزئيۀ و کليۀ در مقدار خواهد بود زيرا که جزئيۀ و کليۀ اگر بحسب المعنى و المفهوم نباشند لا محاله بحسب عظم مقدار و صغر مقدار خواهند بود و الا احدهما اولى بکليۀ و الآخر بجزئيۀ نخواهد بود و نيز هر گاه اجزاء شيء از جزئيات ماهيۀ آن شيء باشند البته آن شيء مقدار يا ذو مقدار خواهد بود پس لازم مي آيد که نفس مقدار باشد يا ذو مقدار و آن باطل است و ايضا اگر تسليم کرده شود که ذات مجرده بعد وحدت منقسم مي شود باجزاء مماثله بالماهيۀ يا مخالفه بالماهيۀ پس هر واحد تعينات آن اجزاء حادث خواهند بود بعد تعلق بابدان پس هر واحد از نفوس من حيث هي هي حادث خواهد بود و ذالک هو المطلوب باقي ماند کلام در اينکه نفوس متعينه باين تعينات حادثه جوهريه آيا وجود کون عقلي تجردي قبل از وجود بدن دارند يا نه چنانکه عند الاستکمال بعقل بالفعل وجود و کينونه عقليه تجرديه مخالف وجود و کون تعليقي نفوس انسانيه متفقه النوع دارند. تحقيق اين مسئله محتاج است باستيناف بحث بر نمط ديگر و ما انشاء الله در فصل ما بعد بتفصيل بيان خواهيم نمود چنانچه اشاره از آن کرديم و ذوق هر واحد وسعت ادراک اين مشرب ندارد و بلکه اکثر طبائع از آن مشمئز مي شوند. اما جواب از وجه ثاني پس ميگوئيم که مميز گاهي ذاتي متميز به مي شود و عرضي براي مشترک فيه و مثل اين عروض بحسب الوجود نيست بلکه بحسب الماهيۀ است مثل عروض فصل براي ماهيت جنس و مثل عروض وجود و تشخص براي ماهيۀ نوع پس امتياز انسان از فرس مثلا بعد از اشتراک آن هر دو در حيوانيۀ و لوازم حيوانيۀ بناطق است و ناطق از عوارض ماهيۀ حيوان است نه از ذاتيات پس عروض آن بحيوانيۀ اگر بعد وجود حيوانيۀ باشد البته ان عروض موقوف خواهد بود بر تميز و تحصل حيوانيۀ بفصل ديگر پس دور يا تسلسل لازم خواهد آمد و ليکن عروض فصل بماهيۀ جنس در ظرف تحليل عقلي ست نه در ظرف وجود خارجي که جنس و فصل در آن بوجود واحد متحد مي باشند پس لازم نمي آيد که تميز مميز فصلي براي نوع که بآن فصل از ساير انواع مشارکه در ماهيۀ جنس متميز باشد موقوف باشد بر تميز اين نوع في نفسه اولا زيرا که فصل محصل جنس است و مقدم است بر جنس بحسب الوجود موخر است از ان بحسب الماهيۀ مثل حالت که درميان وجود و ماهيۀ است و همين حالت است در مميزات شخصيه افراد نوع واحد زيرا که تشخص بنحوي از وجود است کما هو المختار و وجود مقدم است بر ماهيۀ در خارج بنحوي ديگر از تقدم و زيادت وجود بر ماهيۀ بحسب التصور است کما هو مبين في موضعه. اما جواب از وجه ثالث اين است که ما عنقريب بيان خواهيم نمود که نفوس بشريه از حيثيت وجود تعليقي طبيعي قبل از خروج عقول هيولانيه شان من القوه الى الفعل متحد بالنوع اند و برهان قايم است بر اينکه قواي متعلقه باجسام کائنه فاسده نوع شان منحصر در فرو نمي باشد بسبب قصور جوهر آنها از تمام و کمال وعدم احتمال واحد شخصي از انها براي بقاي ابدي زيرا که قواي جسمانيه متناهيه الافعال و الانفعال اند. اما جواب از وجه رابع پس اين است که عنقريب ظاهر خواهد شد بطلان تناسخ نه بر وجهي که بيانش موقوف باشد بر حدوث نفوس بلکه از جهۀ اثبات غايات. اما جواب از وجه خامس پس اين است که عوارض متسابقه في الزمان متوارده بر ذات واحده ممکن نيست که وارد شوند بر ذات واحده مگر باسباب عائده الى القابل از جهۀ حرکات استعداديه در قابل که آن حرکات در غير ماده جسمانيه يافته نمي شوند و قبل الابدان نفوس انسانيه استعدادات جسمانيه که بآن صفات متعاقبه را قابل باشند ندارند تا گفته شود که عروض عارض لاحق به سبب عارض سابق است لا الى بدايۀ. اما جواب از وجه سادس پس اين است که نفوس هيولانيه بعض از بعض ديگر متميز مي شوند بلواحق حاصله به سبب ماده زيرا که حکم نفوس جسمانيۀ الحدوث مثل حکم صور و طبائع است که به سبب مميزات جسمانيه متکثر مي شوند بعد از ان تعيين هر يکي از نفوس بوجود خاص است و آن عين شعور نفوس است بذاتها و اين تعين مستمر مي ماند. ثانيا مع ضرب من التجدد الوجودي فلا جرم يبقي الامتياز بينها دائما و حاصل کلام اين است که امتياز در افراد نوع واحد لابد است که اولا بشيء خارج از ماهيۀ و لوازم ماهيۀ باشد و آن نيست مگر از عوارض ماده پس نفوس که بعد از ابدان باقي هستند تکثر و امتياز که در آنها حاصل و متصور است همان است در حين تلبس بابدان حاصل شده بود و بعد از آن آن حکم مستصحب مي باشد به سبب بقاي اثر تميز در نفوس ولو بالتبع اما نفوس قبل الابدان ممکن نيست که متميز باشند نه بالذات نه بالعرض بل بحسب التبعيۀ و تحقيق ثابت شده است که قبل از عالم حرکات و اتفاقات عروض مخصص خارجي و مميز عرضي مفارق ممکن نيست پس بعد از اتفاق در حقيقت و ماهيۀ امتياز در آن عالم هم غير ممکن است فهذا ما يمکن ان يتکلف في تقرير هذه الحجۀ و فاضل محقق خواجه نصير الدين طوسي اعلى الله مقامه در کتاب تجريد در اثبات حدوث نفس بحدوث بدن دليل مذکور را باين الفاظ بيان فرموده و اما على قول الخصم لو کانت ازليۀ لزم اجتماع الضدين او بطلان ما ثبت او ثبوت ما يمتنع يعني بر قول خصم قائل بقدم عالم اگر نفوس ازلي باشند يکي از امور ثلاثه لازم مي آيد يا اجتماع ضدين يا بطلان ثابت يا ثبوت ممتنع و تالي باطل است و بطلان تالي مستلزم بطلان مقدم است اما بيان ملازمت پس اين است که اگر نفوس قبل الابدان موجود باشند واحد خواهند بود يا متکثر و بر تقدير اول بوقت تعلق بابدان بر وحدت خود باقي مي مانند يا متکثر مي شوند اگر بر وحدت خود باقي مي مانند لا محاله در هر بدن متصف مي شود بصفت مضاد يعني لازم مي آيد که نفس واحد در ابدان مختلفه متصف باشد بصفات متضاده مثل علم و جهل و جبن و شجاعۀ و بخل و سخاوت پس لازم مي آيد اجتماع ضدين و اين است امر اول و اگر گفته شود که اوصاف مذکوره مختلف بالاضافۀ اند پس جايز است که نفس واحد عالم باشد به سبب اضافۀ ببدن زيد و جاهل باشد نسبت به بدن عمرو و هکذا در سائر اوصاف ميگوئيم که اوصاف مذکوره اوصاف ذاتيه نفس اند پس جايز نيست اختلاف اوصاف ذاتيه باضافت چنانچه شيخ رئيس بو علي سينا در فصل ثالث از مقاله خامسه از فن سادس طبيعات شفا مي فرمايد که نحن نعلم ان النفس ليست واحدۀ في الابدان کلّها و لو کانت واحدۀ کثيرۀ بالاضافۀ لکانت عالمۀ فيها کلها او جاهلۀ و لما خفي على زيد ما في نفس عمرو لان الواحد المضاف الى کثيرين يجوز ان يختلف بحسب الاضافۀ و اما الامور الموجودۀ له في ذاته فلا يختلف حتى اذا کانت اب لاولاد کثيرين وهو شاب لم يکن شابا الا بحسب الکلّ اذا الشباب له في نفسه فيدخل في کلّ اضافۀ و کذلک العلم و الجهل و الظن و ما اشبه ذلک انّما يکون من ذات النفس و يدخل مع النفس في کل اضافۀ انتهى و اگر نفس نفوس بر وقت تعلق بابدان بر وحدت خود باقي نباشد بلکه متکثر شوند لازم مي آيد که مقارن حجم و مقدار باشند زيرا که انقسام موجود واحد بسوي موجودات متکثره بدون حجم و مقدار ممتنع است پس لازم مي آيد که مجرد نباشند و حالانکه تجرد نفوس ثابت شده است پس لازم مي آيد بطلان ثابت و اين است امر ثاني و اين مطابق است آنچه مذکور است در شفاء شيخ الرئيس و بر تقدير ثاني يعني اگر قبل از تعلق بابدان متکثر باشند لازم مي آيد تکثر معنى واحد نوعي بلا ماده و اين ممتنع است پس لازم مي آيد ثبوت ممتنع و اين است امر ثالث و اگر گفته شود که بر قول خصم يعني قدم عالم شايد قبل از هر بدن بدن ديگر باشد الى غير النهايۀ چنانکه مذهب تناسخيه است پس لازم نمي آيد ثبوت ممتنع پس ميگوئيم که تکثر نفوس متحده بالنوع بتکثر ابدان وقتي ممکن است که وجود هر فرد از ان نفوس باستعداد بدني از ابدان باشد خواه اين بدن باشد يا بدن ديگر قبل از ان پس اين فرد حادث است نه قديم زيرا که هر چه موقوف است بر استعداد حادث پس آن هم بالضرور حادث خواهد بود و اگر گفته شود شايد که وجود نفس اولا باستعداد قديم است باين معنى که در ازل متعلق شده باشد بجسم قديم بعد از ان منتقل شده باشد باين ابدان حادثه ميگوئيم که انتقال نفس از بدن بعد از فساد بدن است و فساد بر جسم قديم ممتنع است و نيز هر گاه تعلق قديم باشد زوالش ممتنع است پس انتقال هم ممتنع است پس از اين تقرير که ما بيان کرديم ظاهر گرديد که اعتراض ملا علي قوشجي شارح تجريد در اين مقام که اين دليل مبني است بر مقدمات ضعيفه و نيز اينکه دليل حدوث نفس موقوف است بر ابطال تناسخ و ابطال تناسخ موقوف است بر حدوث نفس و اين مستلزم دور است بالکل وارد نمي شود و نا مربوط است زيرا که تجويز قول بتناسخ قادح نيست در دليل حدوث نفس و دليل حدوث نفس مبني نيست بر بطلان تناسخ چنانچه مشهور است مابين متاخرين و الحمد لله ربّ العالمين.