Section Four: Investigating the immortality of the soul after the decay (fasād) of the body
It is agreed upon between those who believe in the distinction of the soul and body and is the relied upon view of the theologians due to texts (nuṣūṣ) that have come to us in this matter from the book (i.e., the Qurʾān) and the sunnah (the Prophetic teachings). Moreover, they have claimed that there a consensus[1] of the ummah[2] on it. The relied upon view of the wise philosophers is the rational demonstration (burhān ʿaqlī) for the non-decay of the soul with the decay of the body. As for the argument of the philosophers such as al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs and others, then it is that it is necessary the soul’s origination, at the time of the origination of the body, is in either of two states. Either they both be in existence together, or one of them would be prior to the other. So, if both are together in existence, they would then both either be together in essence, or not. In the first case, meaning that both are together in essence, this is invalid, otherwise it would entail that the soul and body are both additional. However, the soul and the body are both essences. If, however, the soul and the body are together in existence without one needing the other, then one being non-existence would necessitate the non-existence of their simultaneousness and would not necessitate the non-existence of the other. If one needs the other in existence, it will mean that the one which precedes the other would be either the soul or the body. If the soul is prior in existence, then it would either be temporal priority (taqaddum zamānī) or essential. The first, meaning temporal priority, is invalid because it is proven that the soul does not exist before the body. As for the second, meaning essential priority, that is also invalid because everything that exists, whose existence is the effect of a thing, its non-existence would also be an effect of its non-existence because if the effect becomes non-existent, and despite this subsistence of the cause, the cause is insufficient to necessitate the effect, then the cause will not be a cause but a part of a cause. This goes against the presumption. Thus, if the body is the effect of the soul, its non-existence would be due to the non-existence of the soul. However, the consequent is invalid, because the soul at times becomes non-existence due to other reasons such as bad temperament or bad composition, or differentiation of connection. Thus, the soul is not the cause of the body. Moreover, it is invalid that the body is the cause of the soul because the causes are four[3], and it is impossible for the body to be the agent of the soul, because it would mean that the body is the efficient cause of the existence of the soul by mere corporeality, or due to a matter additional to its corporeality. The first case is invalid, otherwise every body would be as such. The second matter is also invalid. As for the first matter, it is because it has been proven by investigation that the material form, whatever it does, it does due to a state, and that which does not create things without a state, it is impossible for it to create something that is free of a state and space. As for the second matter, then it is because the material form is weaker than the immaterial which exists by its own virtue (qāʾim bi nafsihi), and something weaker cannot be a cause for something stronger (in existence). It is impossible for the body to be an accepting cause for the soul because the soul is immaterial and needless of matter. It is also impossible that the soul be a formal cause of the soul because if the matter is the opposite of it, it is more deserving (awlā). Thus, it is proven that there is no necessitating causal connection between the soul and the body, that the non-existence of one of them be the cause of the non-existence of the other.
If it is said that the body is the cause of the origination of the soul, with origination meaning that its existence is preceded by non-existence, and since the body is the condition for the existence of the soul, then its non-existence would thus be the cause for the non-existence of the soul.
So, in reply, we say that we have explained that the agent, since it is aloof of change, and from it an act emanates after it had not emanated, then it is mandatory that the condition for the origination in it would have not yet been obtained. Also, since that condition is the condition for origination, and since it is in its own existence free of that condition, it is impossible that the non-existence of the condition influence the non-existence of that thing. Moreover, since it has been agreed upon that the condition has been met for it to be a tool for the soul to attain perfections, and the soul per se yearns for perfections, then surely the soul has obtained natural desire (shawq ṭabīʿī) for it to control that body and ordain it in the most correct manner. It is thus not possible for something like this that the non-existence of the condition be a cause for the non-existence of the originated. This is the form of the exposition of the latter-day philosopher such as al-Shaykh al-Raʾīs and others who are from his era.
أقول
I say:
In this argument for the philosophers and their exposition, there are places and locations of considerations as the teacher of the teachers, the leader of the philosophers and theosophists has explained. As for the argument, then we say that the belief in the companionship between the soul and the body is merely coincidental simultaneity (maʿīyyat-i-ittifāqīyyah), without any essential connection between the two, is an invalid statement and absurd belief. This is because the previously mentioned people have explained that the soul is the perfectional form (ṣūrat-i-kamālīyyah) of the body, and they have defined it as the soul being the first perfection for the natural body, such that it is the natural typal limit of it from the genus and differentiate which are both essential, such as the human and celestial sphere (falak) and so on. Such a composition is impossible (mumtaniʿ) to be obtained between two matters where there is no relation of cause and effect between them. So, the truth is that there is an entailing relation between the two of them, not like additional simultaneity and nor like the simultaneity of two effects of one cause in existence, between both there not being a connection (rabṭ) and attachment (taʿalluq). Rather, the simultaneity of the soul and the body is like the simultaneity of two things that are entailed, one by the other. This is like the example of matter and form, and the entailment of both is like the entailment of prime matter and bodily form (ṣūrat-i-jirmīyyah). So, each of the two needs the other, in a way that does not entails circularity. So, the body is in need, in its realization, of the soul, not in particular to it but rather the absolute soul. Moreover, the soul needs the body, not regarding the absolute rational reality of itself, rather, from the aspect of its particular and individual existence and the origination of its soulful identity. Moreover, since this has been proven, we say that if their statement, if it is prior in the existence of the soul, then that priority would either be temporal or essential. We say that the priority of the soul over the body is essential. Their statement that if the body is an effect of the soul, then surely the non-existence of the body would mean the non-existence of the soul. We say that this is how it is because the body, in so far as it is a body (bima hūwa badn), its preparation of non-existence with the soul still existing is impossible. That which remains after the soul is not a body (badn) at all. Rather, it is a corpus (jism) from another type. The body, in so far as it is a body, is conditional with its attachment to the soul, and the soul is the associate (sharīk) cause of the body. If they say that the if the soul were the cause of the body, it would not need the body for its own act. So, if it were not in need of the body, since it is not in its own essence in need of the body, then it must be an intellect, not a soul. We say that the soul, nay, every form whether it be material in existence or material in action, that matter, and those states of that matter have an influence on the soul. Not in the way of independence or in particularity of the soul, rather, by way of association with an immaterial matter according to its absolute nature. Thus, the soul
بما هي طبيعة نفسانية مطلقة مع انحفاظ وحدتها المتبدلة بواحد عقلي ثابت علة مقيمة للبدن
In its being an absolute soulful nature with the preservation of its changing unity with one rational external existence, is a cause that establishes the body.[4]
It needs the body regarding each of its characteristics, like the need of a form for accepting matter (māddah qābilah) in its individualized states. That which they have said that the body is not the material cause of the soul because the soul is immaterial and needless of matter. Then, we say that what is immaterial is the intellect that is actualized, having no attachment whatsoever to bodies. The soul is not like this. Thus, the argument mentioned above, if it is based on the rational essence, whose existence is essential for itself and is not attached with bodies would not be corrupted with the corruption of the body. So, it is clear and evident, but something being an immaterial intellect (ʿaql mufāriq) does not negate its being a soul ordaining the partial body in a way where it is acted upon and becomes complete, in a way of being acted upon and completion. We have explained in what has passed that between the soul and body there is no sheer simultaneity like the rock placed beside the human. Rather, the soul is the perfectional form of the body and is composed of both of those natural types. A matter such as this is not separated from bodies, and a separated (immaterial) thing does not have this relational existence, and the body is not a tool for a separated thing, like the saw, which is the tool of the carpenter, so long as he uses it and until he leaves it. The soul’s being in the body is not like the sailor (rabbān) of a ship and being a homeowner who is not in the house so that he may enter or exit it. This is even though the ship would remain as it is and the house would remain as it is. So, the previously mentioned argument does not prove that the soul remains after the body so long as it has a soulful (nafsānī) existence. Yes, it does prove that the immaterial rational substance is not corrupted with the corruption of the body. What remains is looking at the fact that all souls or some of the souls, either their existence would become impossible towards the existence of a substance which has no attachment to a body and has no need for the completion of the body and its completion. Also, what remains is a discourse on the modality of this change and turning of the substance, and the flight of this state in which the substance which is attached to existence with matter and with becomes a substance separated from matter in that state. You shall soon (ʿan qarīb) know the modality of this, God willing, may He be exalted.
[1] A consensus, especially of relevant authorities, is held to be authoritative in Islamic law, although there is much debate regarding its scope and different method to approach it.
[2] The Islamic community or the Muslims in general.
[3] Referring to Aristotle’s four causes (العلل الأربعة), namely: material cause (العلة المادية), efficient cause (العلة الفاعلية), formal cause (العلة الصورية), and final cause (العلة الغائية).
[4] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, vol. 8, p. 383.
فصل رابع
در تحقيق بقاي نفس بعد فساد بدن يعني عدم فساد نفس بفساد بدن و اين متفق عليه است درميان قائلين بمغائرۀ نفس و بدن و مستند متکلمين نصوص وارده است و در اين باب از کتاب و سنت و نيز ادعاء اجماع امت بر آن نموده اند و مستند حکماي فلاسفه برهان عقلي است بر عدم فساد نفس بفساد بدن اما استدلال حکماي مثل شيخ رئيس وغيره پس اين است که واجب است حدوث نفس بوقت حدوث بدن و خالي از دو حال نيست يا اينکه هر دو معا في الوجود باشند يا احدهما مقدم باشد بر ديگري پس اگر هر دو معا في الوجود باشند پس يا اينکه هر دو معا في الماهيت باشند نه و اول يعني بودن هر دو معا في الماهيت باطل است وگرنه لازم ميآيد که نفس و بدن هر دو مضاف باشند و ليکن نفس و بدن هر دو جواهر اند هف[15] و اگر نفس و بدن هر دو معا في الوجود باشند بدون اينکه احدهما محتاج باشد به ديگري پس عدم هر يکي از اين دو موجب عدم معيۀ است نه موجب عدم ديگري و اگر احدهما محتاج ديگر باشد در وجود پس خالي از اين نيست که مقدم از اين هر دو نفس خواهد بود يا بدن پس اگر مقدم در وجود نفس باشد پس آن تقدم زماني باشد يا ذاتي و اول يعني زماني بودن تقدم باطل است زيرا که ثابت شده است که نفس قبل از بدن موجود نيست و اما ثاني يعني ذاتي بودن تقدم نيز باطل است زيرا که هر موجود که وجودش معلول چيزي باشد عدم آن نيز معلول عدم آن چيز مي باشد به سبب اينکه اگر معلول معدوم بشود با وجود بقاي علۀ آن کافي در ايجاب ان معلول نباشد پس آن علۀ علۀ نخواهد بود بلکه جزو علۀ باشد و اين خلاف فرض است پس اگر بدن معلول نفس باشد البته عدم آن بدن بعدم نفس خواهد بود و تالي باطل است زيرا که بدن گاهي منعدم مي شود باسباب ديگر مثل سوء مزاج يا سوء ترکيب يا تفرق اتصال پس نفس علت بدن نيست و نيز باطل است که بدن علت نفس باشد زيرا که علل چهار اند و محال است که بدن فاعل نفس باشد زيرا که خالي از اين نيست که بدن علت فاعليه وجود نفس باشد بمجرد جسميت يا لازم زايد بر جسميت و اول باطل است و الا بايد که هر جسم چنين باشد و ثاني نيز باطل است اما اولا پس بجهت اينکه تحقيق ثابت شده است که صورت ماديه آنچه ميکند بواسطه وضع مي کند و آن چيزيکه بدون وضع ايجاد نمي نمايد محال است که ايجاد نمايد چيزي را که مجرد از وضع و حيز باشد و اما ثانيا پس بجهت اينکه صورت ماديه اضعف است از مجرد قايم بنفسه واضعف سبب براي اقوي نمي باشد و محال است که بدن علت قابليه نفس باشد زيرا که نفس مجرد مستغني است از ماده و محال است که بدن علت صوريه نفس باشد زيرا که امر اگر عکس آن بشود اولى است پس ثابت شد که اصلا درميان نفس و بدن علاقه واجبۀ الثبوت نيست تا عدم احدهما علت باشد براي عدم ديگر و اگر گفته شود که بدن علت حدوث نفس است و معني حدوث وجود مسبوق بعدم است و چون بدن شرط وجود نفس است پس بايد که عدم او علت براي عدم نفس باشد پس در جواب مي گويند که ما بيان کرده ايم که فاعل چون منزه از تغير باشد و از او فعل صادر شود بعد از آنکه صادر نشده بود پس لا بد است که شرط حدوث در ان هنگام حاصل شده است و آن شرط چون شرط حدوث باشد و در وجود خود از ان شرط غني باشد محال است که عدم شرط موثر باشد در عدم آن شيء و چون اتفاق شده است که آن شرط مستعد شده است که آله نفس بشود در تحصيل کمالات و نفس لذاتها مشتاق کمالات است لا جرم نفس را شوق طبيعي حاصل شده است که تصرف نمايد در ان بدن و تدبيري نمايد در آن بر وجه اصلح و در مثل اين ممکن نيست که عدم آن شرط علت باشد براي عدم حادث اين است صورت تقرير متاخرين مثل شيخ رئيس وغيره آن کسانيکه در طبقه او هستند. اقول در اين استدلال حکماء و تقرير ايشان مساهلات و مواضع انظار اند چنانچه استاذ الاساتذه صدر الحکماء و المتالهين بيان فرموده اند اما در استدلال پس ميگوئيم که قول باينکه صحابۀ بين النفس و البدن مجرد معيت اتفاقيه است بدون علاقه ذاتيه ميان آن دو قول باطل و معتقد سخيف است زيرا که حضرات مذکورين تصريح کرده اند باينکه نفس صورت کماليه بدن است و تعريف نموده اند آن را باينکه نفس کمال اول است براي جسم طبيعي آلى و حکم نموده اند باينکه بانفس حاصل مي شود براي جسم نوع طبيعي که براي آن نوع حد طبيعي باشد از جنس و فصل ذاتيين مثل انسان و فلک وغيره و مثل اين ترکيب ممتنع است که حاصل شود از دو امر که ميان آن دو علاقه عليت و معلوليت نباشد پس حق اينست که ميان آن هر دو علاقه لزوميه است نه مثل معيت متضائفين و نه مثل معيت دو معلول علت واحده در وجود که ميان آن هر دو ربط و تعلق نباشد بلکه معيت نفس و بدن مثل معيت شيئين متلازمين است بوجه مثل ماده صورت و تلازم آن هر دو مثل تلازم هيولى اولى و صورت جرميه است پس هر يکي از ان دو محتاج ديگر است بر وجهيکه دور لازم نيايد پس بدن محتاج است در تحقق خود بسوي نفس لا بخصوصها بلکه مطلق نفس و نفس محتاج است بسوي بدن نه از حيثيت حقيقت مطلقه عقليه خود بلکه من حيث وجود تعينها الشخصيۀ و حدوث هويتها النفسيۀ و چون اين ثابت شد پس ميگوئيم که قولهم اگر مقدم در وجود نفس باشد پس آن تقدم زماني باشد يا ذاتي ميگوئيم که تقدم نفس بر بدن ذاتي است و قولهم اگر بدن معلول نفس باشد البته عدم بدن بعدم نفس خواهد بود مي گوئيم که همچنين است زيرا که بدن بما هو بدن مستعد عدمش باوجود نفس ممتنع است و آنچه بعد از نفس باقي مي ماند اصلا بدن نيست بلکه جسم است از نوع ديگر و بدن بما هو بدن مشروط است بتعلق نفس و نفس شريک علۀ بدن است و اگر بگوئيند که نفس اگر علت بدن باشد بايد که در فعل خود محتاج بدن نشود پس اگر در فعل خود محتاج بدن نشود و چنانچه در ذات خود محتاج بدن نيست پس بايد که عقل باشد نه نفس ميگوئيم که نفس بلکه هر صورت خواه ماديۀ الوجود باشد يا ماديۀ الفعل در نفس آن ماده و حالات آن ماده تاثير مي نمايد نه بروجه استقلال يا بخصوصها بلکه بروجه شرکت بامر مفارق بحسب طبيعتها المطلقۀ پس نفس بما هي طبيعۀ نفسانيۀ مطلقۀ مع انحفاظ وحدتها المتبدلۀ بواحد عقلي ثابت علۀ مقيمۀ للبدن و آن بحسب هر خصوصيت خود محتاج ببدن است مثل افتقار صورت در احوال مشخصه خود بسوي ماده قابله و آنچه گفته اند که بدن علۀ ماديه نفس نيست زيرا که نفس مجرد است مستغني است از ماده پس ميگوئيم که مجرد آن است که عقل بالفعل باشد و اصلا تعلق او باجسام نباشد و نفس همچنين نيست پس دليل مذکور اگر قايم است بر اينکه ذات عقليه که وجودش وجود عقلي است لذاتها و متعلق باجسام نيست فاسد نمي شود بفساد بدن پس اين بين و واضح است و ليکن بودن شيء عقل مفارق منافي است بودن آن را نفس مدبر بدن جزئي بر وجهيکه منفعل بشود و مستکمل شود بآن بدن نحوي از انفعال و استکمال و در ما سبق بيان کرديم که درميان نفس و بدن مجرد معيت نيست مثل حجر که موضوع است در جنب انسان بلکه نفس صورت کماليه بدن است و مرکب مي شود از ان هر دو نوع طبيعي و مثل اين امر مفارق از اجسام نمي باشد و امر مفارق اين وجود تعلقي ندارد و بدن آله امر مفارق نمي شود مثل منشار که آله نجار است تا گاهي او را استعمال نمايد و گاه ترک نمايد و نيز بودن آن در بدن مثل بودن ربان سفينه و بودن صاحب دار در دار نيست که در آن داخل شود و خارج شود و حالانکه سفينه بحال باقي خود باشد و دار بحال بخود باقي باشد پس دليل مذکور دلالت ندارد بر بقاي نفس بعد از بدن مادام که وجود نفساني دارد آري دلالت مي کند بر اين که جوهر مفارق عقلي فاسد نيست بفساد بدن باقي ماند نظر در اين که جميع نفوس يا بعض نفوس آيا وجود شان مستحيل مي شود بسوي وجود جوهريکه تعلق بجسم ندارد و حاجت باستعمال بدن و استکمال آن ندارد و باقي مانده است کلام در کيفيت اين تحول و انقلاب جوهري و طريان حالت که جوهر متعلق الوجود بماده بآن حالت جوهر مفارق ازماده بشود و عنقريب کيفيت اين را خواهي دانست انشاء الله تعالى.