Section Five: The impossibility of the decay of the soul
Regarding this, the wise philosophers have mentioned two arguments. One of the two is that the soul is a contingent existence, and every contingent thing has a cause (sabab) prior to itin existence. That prior thing is a cause for the soul, and so long as the cause remains and exists with all its aspects (jihāt) from the respect of which it had become the cause, then it would be impossible that the effect (musabbab) ceases to exist (inʿidām), as is mentioned in the discussions on cause and effect. Thus, if the soul ceases to exist then it would surely either be due to its cause ceasing to exist or a part of its perfect cause (sabab tāmm) ceasing to exist. The causes are four, and it is impossible that the soul ceases to exist due to the efficient cause of the soul ceasing to exist, because the efficient cause of the soul is a rational substance separated from matter per se from all aspects (min jamīʿ al-wujūh), and it is impossible for it to stop existing. Moreover, it is impossible for the soul to stop existing due to the non-existence of the material cause of the soul because the soul is not material, rather, it is immaterial. Moreover, it is impossible for the soul to stop existing due to the non-existence of its formal cause because the form of the soul is its own essence, and the discussion on the non-existence of the formal cause is the same as the discussion on the non-existence of the soul itself. If the non-existence of the soul is due to the non-existence of another form, other than the form of the soul, it would entail an infinite regress. Moreover, it is impossible that the soul stops existing due to the non-existence of its final cause because the final cause of the soul is the soul’s own essence. So, the non-existence of the soul is absolutely (muṭlaqan) impossible. As for the forms and accidents, for which non-existence is possible, then it is due to the possibility of non-existence of one of their causes.
The other argument is that every renewed thing and before its renewal is a contingent existent, otherwise it would be something impossible, and something impossible is not an existent. So, it entails that the renewed thing become non-renewed, which goes against our premise. What is meant by this is the space of complete aptitude (makān-i-istiʿdād-i-tāmm). This complete aptitude gives rise to a place because what is in it of contingency of existence of a thing is that it has potentiality of being, and that thing, meaning the aptitude, is close to that thing that is obtained. Once this is proven, we say that if non-existence were possible for the soul, it is necessary that there be something in the soul which can decay, and that thing would not be the essence of the soul because the essence of the soul does not remain with decay. That thing which has the possibility of decay in the soul must remain with decay. So, that thing is the matter of the soul, and the soul would be one with material. Thus, we divert the discourse to that matter. So, if it were possible for it to decay, it would need another matter, and this would entail an infinite regress, and that is possible. Since infinite regress has been cut off, then that root (sinkh) remains from that kind (qabīl) which cannot decay or become non-existent, which is a part of the soul. That part of the soul that remains would not be one that has a state (dhāt waḍʿ), otherwise, it would negate it accompanying the rational forms. Moreover, it would be a thing that is has a state or occupies space, which is impossible. Also, since the thing whose subsistence has been proven is free of state and space, and accepts rational forms, that part of the soul would remain by itself. This is because what is meant by the soul is nothing except the immaterial substance that accepts rational forms. So, non-existence would not be possible for the soul. If it is said that does the soul not have matter which has the potentiality to originate the soul? If so, then why is it not possible that the decay of the soul be obtained in that matter? We say that what has potentiality of origination in it is the body, and the body is from that kind whose subsistence is possible with origination. As for that within which the potential for decay is present, if it is a body, then surely the body would remain with the decay of the soul. However, it is agreed upon that the body does not remain with the decay of the soul.
فظهر الفرق بين البابين
So, the difference between the two matters becomes manifest.[1]
This is the summary (ḥāṣil) of that is present in the writings of the people. However, both arguments which have been established only show to prove that the decay of the of every simple substance separate in existence from matter and the attachments of matter being impossible. It does not show the impossibility of the decay of a thing whose existence is relational and attached. Something like that immaterial existence, since its decay with the decay of the body is impossible, its origination due to the origination of the body is also similarly impossible. Rather, that existence has no renewal because whenever it is existent it is corrupted, and whenever it is not corrupted it is not existent. In short (bil-jumlah), that which is existent with one existence in number is impossible to have been originated and be separate from matter, except if substantial intensified motion occurs for it and it becomes immaterial after it had been attached. What remains is the objection of how its immaterial existence has become originated despite it not having a sheer attachment to matter, neither does it have aptitude of existence. The reply to this objection, as was promised, shall soon follow. In summary, the reply is that what is meant by the soul being immaterial is not that existence as an immaterial affair is originated for the soul. Rather, it means the attached existence of the soul being cut off when it returns to its original beginning point (mabdaʾ-i-aṣlī). So, in reality the origination of an immaterial affair for a thing means the connection between both things. Such is the origination of memory for the soul, which is the depository of all rational matters of the soul. As for what is mentioned at this place regarding the difference between the bearer of the potentiality of origination and the bearer of the potentiality of decay and that the body has the potential for the origination of the soul since it continues to exist due to the soul and that it does not have the potential to decay since it does not continue to exist with it. So, there is a fallacy (mughālaṭah) in this. The reason for the fallacy is the shared usage of the word “acceptance” and applying it sometimes to mean potential aptitude and sometimes to mean being acted upon, description as well as not differentiating what is essential and accidental. This is because the bearer of the potentiality of origination of the soul is not a body that is alive. Rather, it is something else such as the sperm (nuṭfah)
وما يجرى مجراها
And so on.[2]
And it does not continue to exist at the time of the origination of the soulful form. Moreover, the body continues to exist due to the body and accepts the soul in terms of the completion of the soul from the kind of completion of a material part with a material form from composite things. Moreover, it is possible that the body per se accepts the potential for the decay of the soul, and whatever accepts decay is something else that remains with decay. So, in the acceptor both things, meaning generation and corruption, are different respects. One respect is:
ما منه الشيء
What the thing is from.[3]
And the other respect is:
ما فيه الشيء
What the thing is in.[4]
فكن متيقظا فاستمع ما سيقرع سمعك يوم يناد المناد من مكان قريب
So, become alert and listen what shall soon strike your hearing on the day when the caller calls out from a proximate location.[5]
A mention of the eastern (dhikr mīʿād mashriqī)
Know that the virtuous researcher of the latter-day philosophers, Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī, may Allāh elevate his rank, sent some difficult questions to the virtuous contemporary of his, the skillful master Shams al-Dīn Khusraw Shāhī, so that he may remove the aspects of their difficulty and may tie his objection to a firm root. So, that virtuous contemporary did not send a reply and remained incapable of doing so. One of those difficult questions that remained unanswered was the continual existence of the soul after the body. The exposition of the question of the researcher, may Allāh elevate his rank, was as such:
ما بال القائلين بأن ما لا حامل لإمكان وجوده وعدمه فإنه لا يمكن أن يوجد بعد العدم أو يعدم بعد الوجود حكموا بحدوث النفس الإنسانية وامتنعوا عن تجويز فنائها- فإن جعلوا حامل إمكان وجودها البدن فهلا جعلوه حامل إمكان عدمها أيضا وإن جعلوها لأجل تجردها عما يحل فيه عادم حامل لإمكان العدم كيلا يجوز عدمها بعد الوجود فهلا جعلوها لأجل ذلك بعينه عادم حامل لإمكان الوجود فيمتنع وجودها بعد العدم في الأصل- وكيف ساغ لهم أن جعلوا جسما ماديا حاملا لإمكان وجود جوهر مفارق مباين الذات إياه فإن جعلوها من حيث كونها مبدأ لصورة نوعية لذلك الجسم ذات حامل- لإمكان الوجود فهلا جعلوها من تلك الحيثية بعينها ذات حامل لإمكان العدم وبالجملة ما الفرق بين الأمرين في تساوي النسبتين
What has happened to those who believe that something that cannot bear the possibility of its existence and non-existence can surely not come into existence after non-existence, or become non-existence after existence? They have ruled in favor of the origination of the human soul and have desisted from deeming its perishing possible. If they make the bearer of the possibility of the soul’s existence as the body, then they have also made it the carrier of the possibility of its non-existence as well. Moreover, if they make the soul as such due to its immateriality from what inheres in it of something that is not capable of bearing the possibility of non-existence, lest they make the soul’s non-existence possible after existence. So, they have thus made the soul due to this per se the one not capable of carrying the possibility of non-existence. So, its existence would be impossible after non-existence in principle. So, how can they then make the material body the bearer of the possibility of the existence of an immaterial substance distinct in essence from it. For surely, they have made the soul from its being the starting point of the typal form for that body the one that bears the possibility of existence. So, did they not make the soul from that aspect per se the very bearer of the possibility of non-existence and in short what is the difference between the two matters in their attribution being equal?[6]
That which is in the books, even in the commentary on al-Ishārāt, in reply to this objection is incomplete, and the leader of the philosophers and theosophists as well in the initial part of his life deemed it incomplete and would answer this objection by saying that the human body with a special aptitude of its own summons from the bestower (wāhib) of forms on the acceptors of an ordained form so that it may exert control in that body. The control is such that it protects the individuality and type of the body. So, it is necessary for the form to emanate from the bestower and diffuser. However, the existence of the form that is the source of the human ordainments and human actions should be one that maintains a moderation in disposition (mizaj) is not possible except with the spiritual power of the person who has perception, intellect, thought and distinction. So, from the starting point of the diffusion which has no stinginess or hinderance, the substance of the soul and the reality of the soul issues forth. So, the existence of the body with possibility of aptitude of itself does not summon except the immaterial form that controls the body
بما هي صورة مقارنة
In it being an accompanying form.[7]
However, the generosity of the initial point of diffusion necessitates that the form be controlling, one that has an immaterial reality or has an immaterial starting point, since it is possible for one thing to be a substance from one aspect and an accident from another aspect, like the formal substance obtained in the mind which according to the philosophers is proven to be a formal substance and needless of a subject in regard to its essence, and the accident is in need of a subject in regard to its mental and knowledgeable existence. Rather, it is the modality of the soul in their view. Similarly, it is possible that one thing be created from one aspect and uncreated from another aspect, such as the existence and essence of a thing. So, it is similarly possible that one thing such as the human soul be immaterial regarding its being a rational essence or from regarding it having a rational essence and be material from its being something that controls the body or regarding it having the power to control the body. So, since the soul is immaterial regarding essence and material regarding action, then the soul regarding its action is preceded by aptitude of the originated body, with the body’s origination it originated and with the body’s demise it demises. As for the aspect of its original reality or the beginning point of its reality, then it is not preceded by the body but only in accident and is not corrupted by the corruption of the body and the material deficiencies do not get attached to it except in accident. After the exposition of this answer, he (Mullā Ṣadrā) says:
هذا ما سنح لنا في سالف الزمان على طريقة أهل النظر
This is what became apparent for us in the previous time on the way of the people of opinion.[8]
As for that which the leader of the philosophers said in reply to this question and solving this difficult query when his intellect had been perfected, it is that for the human soul there are essential stations and origination points, some of these stations and origination points are from the Realm of Command (ʿālam-i-amr) and ordainment, as has been mentioned in the divine scripture:
…قُلِ الرُّوحُ مِنْ أَمْرِ رَبِّي… ﴿الإسراء: ٨٥﴾
…Say, “the spirit is from the command of my Lord.”… [17:85]
Some of those stations and origination points are from the Realm of Creation (ʿālam-i-khalq) and formation such as what He says in the divine noble book:
مِنْهَا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ وَفِيهَا نُعِيدُكُمْ وَمِنْهَا نُخْرِجُكُمْ تَارَةً أُخْرَىٰ ﴿طه: ٥٥﴾
From it have We created you and in it shall We return you and from it shall we take you out once again. [20:55]
So, the origination and renewal are in some of the stations and origination points of the soul. Thus, we say that since for the human soul there are many developments and changes from the first origination point to the second one, as has been alluded to:
قوله تعالى
In His, may He be exalted, statement:
وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَاكُمْ ثُمَّ صَوَّرْنَاكُمْ ثُمَّ قُلْنَا لِلْمَلَائِكَةِ اسْجُدُوا لِآدَمَ… ﴿الأعراف: ١١﴾
And surely, We created you, then We shaped you, then We said to the angels, “Prostrate to Adam…” [7:11]
So, since it develops and changes from the Realm of Creation towards the Realm of Command, its existence becomes a rational immaterial existence. At that time, it is not in need of the body, the states of the body and the aptitude of the body. So, the demise of the aptitude of the body from the soul in the essence of the soul and the subsistence of the soul does not harm it. Rather, in the attachment and control of the soul it causes harm since the originated existence of the soul is not the continual existence of the soul, since the originated existence is material, and the continual existence is separated from matter. So, the state of the soul at the time of origination is other than the state it has at the time of its completion and travel towards its active starting point. Thus, the soul in reality is corporeal in origination and spiritual in subsistence. The example of the soul is like the example of a child who is initially in need of his mother’s womb and at the end is needles of the womb due to change in existence of that child. Moreover, the example is that of a hunting and preying where he is initially in need of a trap for hunting and at the end the hunter is needless of the trap. So, the decay of the womb and the trap do not negate the infant and the prey’s remainder, and the decay of the womb and trap do not harm the infant and the prey. Moreover, the need of a thing for another is not from the necessitating matters of need due to essential entailments of the other thing, like the need of the existence of an effect for its maker without its essence, since essence is uncreated, despite it being from the entailments of existence. Such is the view of the leader of the philosophers and those who believe in the Primacy of Essence[9] consider existence to be from the necessary entailments of essence. Furthermore, it is like the example of a triangle which is an effect in need of its maker and it’s not needing anything in its being three sides. Know that the godly philosophers proved for the temperaments as having natural movement towards their essential ends. They also proved that every incomplete thing has an inclination or instinctual desire for its own perfection. Moreover, every incomplete thing, when it reached the perfection of its existence, becomes another existence, and this natural movement in the temperament of the human type towards the holy realm is known and observed for the person having insight. Thus, since the soul in its own completions and turnings reaches the station of the intellect and changes, it unites with the absolute intellect as well as the active intellect and becomes an active intellect. Rather, it becomes an intellect acted upon, meaning the soul and thought do not remain. So, it demises from matter and potentiality and contingency are taken away from it. What remains is subsistence through Allāh (baqāʾ billāh), the glorious and exalted. In short, the investigation of this discussion and clarification of it is not easy except for the one who is cognizant of the modality of the unity of the soul with the active intellect and is a knower of the journey of things. Allāh, the exalted, says:
ذَٰلِكَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ يُؤْتِيهِ مَن يَشَاءُ… ﴿الجمعة: ٤﴾
That is the bounty of Allāh, He gives it to whomever he wills… [62:4, also found in 3:73, 5:54, 57:21 & 57:29]
Also, know that the origination points of existence are successive and greater than one another with the existence of their difference. Some of them are attached to some, and the end of each rank is the beginning of another. The last of the grades of these relational origination points is the first of the grades of the immaterial origination points. In the realm of absolute immateriality there is no state of origination, change or appearance. So, that realm does not change due to the entrance of the soul into it, just as it does not change by its emanation of the soul.
كما علمت في الفصل السابق
As you know from the previous section.[10]
So, the returning of the soul to the realm is like the emanation of the soul from that realm. So, it is necessary that you ponder this matter truly and understand it appropriately which we have explained in various places, so that your heart may be enlightened with the illumination of the light of gnosis from the realm of diffusion and inspiration.
والله يدعو إلى دار السلام
And Allāh calls to the abode of peace.[11]
[1] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, vol. 8, p. 388.
[2] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, vol. 8, p. 389.
[3] Ibid, 390.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid. The last part is a reference to the verse:
وَاسْتَمِعْ يَوْمَ يُنَادِ الْمُنَادِ مِن مَّكَانٍ قَرِيبٍ ﴿ق: ٤١﴾
And listen on the day when the caller calls out from a proximate location. [50:41]
[6] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, vol. 8, pp. 390 – 391.
[7] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, vol. 8, p. 392.
[8] Ibid.
[9] One of the two competing views in Islamic philosophy are those who believe in the Primacy of Being (أصالة الوجود) and those who believe in the Primacy of Essence (أصالة الماهية). The former view is held by Mullā Ṣadrā among others, while the latter view was that of Shaykh al-Ishrāq.
[10] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, vol. 8, p. 396.
[11] This is a reference to the verse:
وَاللَّهُ يَدْعُو إِلَىٰ دَارِ السَّلَامِ وَيَهْدِي مَن يَشَاءُ إِلَىٰ صِرَاطٍ مُّسْتَقِيمٍ ﴿يونس: ٢٥﴾
And Allāh calls to the abode of peace, and guides whom he wills to a straight path. [10:25].
The abode of peace (دار السلام) is a jurisprudential (فقهي) term as opposed to the abode of war (دار الحرب). However, in this context, it refers to the hereafter and paradise.
فصل خامس
در اينکه فساد بر نفس محال است حکماي فلاسفه در بيان آن دو دليل ذکر کرده اند يکي از ان دو اين است که نفس ممکنۀ الوجود است و هر ممکن پس از براي او سبب است در وجود آن پس براي نفس سبب است و سبب مادام که باقي است و موجود است با جميع جهات که باعتبار آن جهات سبب شده است محال است انعدام مسبب چنانچه در مباحث علت و معلول مذکور است پس نفس اگر منعدم شود البته انعدام آن به سبب انعدام سبب آن است يا به سبب انعدام چيزي از اجزاء سبب تام و اسباب چهار اند و محال است که نفس منعدم به سبب انعدام سبب فاعلي نفس زيرا که سبب فاعلي نفس جوهر عقلي مفارق الذات است من جميع الوجوه از ماده و ممتنع است عدم او و نيز محال است که نفس منعدم شود به سبب انعدام سبب مادي نفس زيرا که نفس مادي نيست بلکه مجرد است و نيز محال است که نفس منعدم شود به سبب انعدام سبب صوري زيرا که صورت نفس بعينها ذات نفس است و کلام در عدم سبب صوري مثل کلام است در عدم نفس و اگر انعدام نفس به سبب انعدام صورت ديگر باشد غير از صورت نفس تسلسل لازم مي آيد و نيز محال است که نفس منعدم شود به سبب انعدام سبب غائي نفس زيرا که غايت نفس هم ذات نفس است پس عدم نفس مطلقا ممتنع است و اما صور و اعراض که عدم بر آنها صحيح است پس به سبب صحت عدم است بر يکي از اسباب آنها دليل ديگر اين است که هر متجدد قبل از تجدد ممکن الوجود است و الا ممتنع باشد و ممتنع موجود نيست پس لازم مي آيد که متجدد غير متجدد باشد و اين خلاف فرض است و مراد از اين امکان استعداد تام است و اين استعداد تام مستدعي محل است زيرا که آنچه در او امکان وجود شيء موجود باشد آن است که در او قوت وجود آن شيء يعني استعداد قريب آن شيء حاصل است چون اين ثابت شد پس ميگوئيم که اگر عدم بر نفس صحيح باشد واجب است که در نفس چيزي باشد که در آن امکان آن فساد موجود باشد و آن چيز ذات نفس نيست زيرا که ذات نفس بافساد باقي نمي باشد و آن چيزي که در او امکان فساد است واجب است که بافساد باقي باشد پس آن چيز ماده نفس است و نفس ذو ماده باشد پس نقل مي کنيم کلام بسوي آن ماده پس اگر جايز باشد بر آن فساد محتاج باشد بسوي ماده ديگر پس تسلسل لازم مي آيد و آن محال است و چون تسلسل منقطع شود پس آن سنخ باقي از ان قبيل است که بر آن فساد و عدم جايز نباشد و آن جزو نفس است و آن جزو باقي نفس ذات وضع نباشد و الا نفس منافي باشد براي مقارنت صور عقليه و نيز ذات وضع و حيز باشد و آن محال است و چون آن شيء که بقاي او ثابت است مجرد از وضع و حيز باشد و قابل صور عقليه باشد آن جزو باقي نفس باشد بعينها زيرا که مراد به نفس نيست مگر جوهر مجرد قابل صور عقليه پس عدم بر نفس صحيح نباشد و اگر گفته شود که آيا براي نفس ماده نيست که در آن قوت حدوث نفس موجود باشد پس چرا جايز نيست که حاصل شود در آن ماده قوت فساد نفس پس مي گوئيم که آنچه در او قوۀ حدوث است بدن است و بدن از ان قبيل است که بقاي او با حدوث صحيح است اما آنچه در او قوت فساد موجود است اگر بدن باشد البته بدن باقي باشد با فساد نفس و اتفاق است بر اينکه بدن باقي نمي ماند با فساد و نفس فظهر الفرق بين البابين اين است حاصل آنچه در مسفورات قوم است و اين هر دو دليل که اقامه نموده اند دلالت دارند بر امتناع فساد هر جوهر بسيط مبائن الوجود از ماده و لواحق ماده نه بر امتناع فساد آن چيزيکه وجودش اين وجود ارتباطي تعلقي است و مثل آن وجود مجرد چنانچه فساد او بفساد بدن ممتنع است همچنين حدوث او بحدوث بدن ممتنع است بلکه آن وجود تجدد ندارد زيرا که هر چه کائن است فاسد است و هر چه فاسد نيست کاين نسيت و بالجمله آنچه موجود است بوجود واحد ما بعد و ممتنع است که حادث باشد و مفارق از ماده مگر اينکه واقع شود براي او حرکت جوهريه اشتداديه و مجرد شود بعد اينکه متعلق باشد باقي ماند اشکال در اينکه وجود تجردي او چه طور حادث شده است و حالانکه مجرد تعلق بماده ندارد و نه بري او استعداد وجود است و جواب از اين اشکال حسب الوعده عنقريب خواهد آمد و مختصر آن جواب اين است که مراد از مجرد بودن نفس نه اين است که وجود امر مجرد براي نفس حادث شود بلکه عبارت است از قطع وجود تعلقي نفس و رجوع آن بسوي مبداء اصلي خود پس بالحقيقت حدوث امر مجرد براي چيزي عبارت است از حدوث رابطه ميان آن هر دو چنانچه در حدوث حافظه براي نفس و آن خزانه معقولات نفس است اما آنچه مذکور است در اين مقام از بيان فرق درميان حامل قوت حدوث و حامل قوت فساد و اينکه در بدن قوت حدوث نفس است زيرا که باقي مي ماند با نفس و در آن قوت فساد نيست زيرا که باقي نمي ماند با نفس پس در اين مغالطه است و مبناي مغالطه اشتراک لفظ قبول است و اطلاق آن گاهي بمعنى قوۀ استعداديه و گاهي بمعني انفعال و اتصال و عدم فرق بين ما بالذات و ما بالعرض زيرا که حامل قوت حدوث نفس بدن حي نيست بلکه چيزي ديگر است مثل نطفه و ما يجري مجريها و آن باقي نيست بوقت حدوث صورت نفسانيه و بدن که با نفس باقي است قابل نفس است بمعنى المستکمل بالنفس از قبيل استکمال جز مادي بجزء صوري از مرکب و جايز است که بدن بعينه قابل قوت فساد نفس باشد و آنچه قبول فساد ميکند چيزي ديگر است که باقي است بافساد پس در قابل هر يکي از طرفين يعني کون و فساد دو اعتبار متغاير اند يکي اعتبار ما منه الشيء دوئم اعتبار ما فيه الشيء فکن متيقظا فاستمع ما سيقرع سمعک يوم يناد المناد من مکان قريب.
ذکر ميعاد مشرقي
بدانکه محقق فاضل المتاخرين نصير الدين محمد الطوسي اعلى الله مقامه بخدمت فاضل معاصر عالم تحرير شمس الدين خسرو شاهي چند مسائل معضله فرستادند تا که از وجوه اعضال آنها کشف نمايد و عقد اشکال آنها را حل نمايد پس آن فاضل معاصر جوابي نفرستاد و عاجز ماند و مسئله بقاي نفس بعد از بدن يکي از ان مسايل معضله غير مجابه بود تقرير سوال محقق اعلى الله مقامه اين بود ما بال القائلين بان ما لا حامل لامکان وجوده و عدمه فاته لايمکن ان يوجد بعد العدم او يعدم بعد الوجود حکموا بحدوث النفس الانسانيۀ و امتنعوا عن تجويز فنائها فان جعلوا حامل امکان وجودها البدن فهلا جعلوه حامل امکان عدمها ايضا و ان جعلوها لاجل تجرد ها عمّا يحل فيه عادم حامل لامکان العدم کيلا يجوز عدمها بعد الوجود فهلا جعلوا ها لاجل ذلک بعينه عادم حامل لامکان الوجود فيمتنع وجود ها بعد العدم في الاصل و کيف ساغ لهم ان جعلوا جسما ماديا حاملا لامکان وجود جوهر مفارق مباين الذات اياه فان جعلوها من حيث کونها مبداء لصورۀ نوعيۀ لذلک الجسم ذات حامل لامکان الوجود فهلا جعلواها من تلک الحيثيۀ بعينها ذات حامل لامکان العدم و بالجمله ما الفرق بين الامرين في تساوي النسبتين انتهى يعني چه حال آنکساني است که قائل اند باينکه چيزي که حاملي براي امکان وجود و عدم آن نباشد ممکن نيست که موجود باشد بعد از عدم يا معدوم شود بعد از وجود حکم کرده اند بحدوث نفس انسانيه و امتناع نموده اند از تجويز فناي نفس پس اگر بدن را حامل امکان وجود نفس قرار داده اند پس چرا آنرا حامل امکان عدم نفس نيز قرار ندادند و اگر قرار دادند نفس را به سبب تجرد نفس از چيزي که حلول نمايد در آن عادم حامل امکان عدم تا که عدم بعد از وجود جايز نباشد پس چرا قرار ندادند آنرا به سبب تجرد نفس عادم حامل امکان وجود پس ممتنع باشد وجود او بعد از عدم در اصل و چه طور جايز است براي ايشان که قرار داده اند جسم مادي را حامل امکان وجود جوهر مفارق که مباين الذات با جسم مادي است پس اگر قرار داده اند نفس را از حيثيت بودن آن مبداء صورت نوعيه آن جسم ذات حامل امکان وجود پس چرا آنرا از اين حيثيت بعينها ذات حامل امکان عدم قرار ندادند و بالجمله چه فرق است درميان دو امر در تساوي نسبتين و آنچه در کتب حتى در شرح اشارات از اين اشکال جواب داده شده است تمام نيست و خود هم آن را ناتمام دانسته و صدر الحکماء و المتالهين در ابتداء زمان خود از اين اشکال باين طور جواب داده اند که بدن انساني باستعداد خاص خود استدعا نموده است از واهب الصور بر قوابل صورت مدبره را که تصرف نمايد در آن بدن تصرفيکه حفظ نمايد بآن تشخص و نوع بدن را پس واجب شد صدور صورت از واهب فياض ليکن وجود صورت که مصدر تدابير بشريه و افاعيل انسيه حافظ مزاج اعتدالي باشد ممکن نيست مگر بقوۀ روحانيه صاحب ادراک و عقل و فکر و تميز پس لا محاله ازجانب مبداء فياض که بخل و منع دران نيست فايض مي شود جوهر نفس و حقيقت نفس پس وجود بدن بامکان استعدادي خود مستدعي نيست مگر صورت مفارقه را که تصرف نمايد در ان بما هي صورۀ مقارنۀ و ليکن جود مبداء فياض مقتضي صورت متصرفه است که صاحب حقيقت مفارقه است يا صاحب مبداء مفارق است و چنانکه شيء واحد جايز است که جوهر باشد از جهتي و عرض باشد از جهت ديگر مثل صورت جوهريه حاصله در ذهن که عند الحکماء ثابت است که آن صورت جوهر است و مستغني از موضوع بحسب ماهيت و عرض است محتاج بسوي موضوع بحسب وجود ذهني علمي بلکه کيفيت نفسانيه است عندهم و همچنين جايز است که شيء واحد مجعول باشد از جهتي وغير مجعول باشد از جهت ديگر مثل وجود و ماهيت شيء واحد پس همچنين جايز است که شيء واحد مثل نفس انسانيه مجرد باشد از حيثيت بودن آن ذات عقليه يا از اين حيثيت که از براي او ذات عقليه است و مادي باشد از حيثيت بودن آن متصرف در بدن يا از اين حيثيت که براي او قوت متصرفه است در بدن پس چون نفس مجرد باشد از حيثيت ذات و مادي باشد از حيثيت فعل پس نفس از حيثيت فعل مسبوق است باستعداد بدن حادث است بحدوث بدن زايل است بزوال بدن و اما از حيثيت حقيقت اصليه خود يا مبداء حقيقت خود پس مسبوق باستعداد بدن نيست مگر بالعرض و فاسد نيست بفساد بدن و نقائص ماديات بآن ملحق نمي شوند مگر بالعرض و بعد از تقرير اين جواب فرموده اند که هذا ما سخ لنا في سالف الزمان على طريقۀ اهل النظر يعني اين جواب آن است که در سالف زمان ما داده بوديم بر طريقۀ اهل نظر و اما آنچه صدر الحکماء در آخر زمان که زمان کمال عقل بود در دفع اين سوال و حل اين اعضال فرموده اند اين است که براي نفس انسانيه مقامات و نشاءَات ذاتيه است که بعض آن مقامات و نشآءَت از عالم امر و تدبير است چنانچه در صحيفه الهيه وارد شده است قل الروح من امر ربّي و بعض آن مقامات و نشآءَت از عالم خلق و تصوير است چنانچه در کتاب کريم الهي مي فرمايد منها خلقنا کم و فيها نعيد کم و منها تخرجکم تارۀ اخرى پس حدوث و تجدد در بعض مقامات و نشاءَت نفوس است پس مي گوئيم که چون براي نفس انسانيه ترقيات و تحولات است از نشاءَ اولى براي نشاء ديگر چنانچه اشاره شده است از او در قوله تعالى و لقد خلقناکم ثم صورنا کم ثمّ قلنا للملائکۀ اسجدوا لآدم پس چون ترقي نمايد و تحويل نمايد از عالم خلق بسوي عالم امر وجودش وجود مفارق عقلي مي شود و در آن هنگام محتاج بدن و احوال بدن و استعداد بدن نمي شود پس زوال استعداد بدن از نفس در ذات نفس و بقاي نفس ضرر نرساند بلکه در تعلق و تصرف نفس ضرر ميرساند زيرا که وجود حدوثي نفس وجود بقاي نفس نيست زيرا که وجود حدوثي مادي است و وجود بقاي مفارق از ماده است پس حالت نفس در وقت حدوث غير آن حالت است که در وقت استکمال و مصير آن است بسوي مبداء فعّال پس نفس في الحقيقت جسمانيه الحدوث است و روحانيت البقاء و مثال نفس مثال طفل است که اولا محتاج برحم مادر است در آخر ازآن مستغني ميشود از رحم به سبب تبدل وجود بر آن طفل و نيز مثال مثال صيد و شکار است که اولا در اصطياد خود بسوي شبکه محتاج است و در آخر در بقاي خود نبرد صياد مستغني است از شبکه پس فساد رحم و شبکه منافي بقاءَ مولود و صيد نيست و فساد رحم و شبکه مولود و صيد را ضرر نرساند و نيز حاجت شيء بسوي امري از امور مستلزم احتياج لوازم ذاتيه آن شيء بسوي آن امر نيست مثل حاجت وجود معلول بسوي جاعل بدون ماهيت آن زيرا که ماهيۀ غير مجهول است باوجود آنکه از لوازم وجود است چنانچه مذهب صدر الحکماء است و کسانيکه باصالت ماهيت قائل اند وجود را از لوازم ذاتيه ماهيت قرار داده اند و نيز مثل حاجت وجود مثلث معلول بسوي جاعل و عدم احتياج آن در بودن ذو الزوايا الثلاثه بدانکه حکماءَ الهيين اثبات نموده اند براي طبايع حرکت جبليه بسوي غايات ذاتيه و اثبات نموده اند براي هر ناقص ميل يا شوق غريزي بسوي کمال خود و هر ناقص چون واصل ميشود بسوي کمال خود وجودش وجود ديگري مي شود و اين حرکت جبليه در طبيعت نوع انساني بجانب عالم قدس معلوم و مشاهد است براي صاحب بصيرت پس چون نفس در استکمالات خود و توجهات خود تا مقام عقل ميرسد و متحول مي شود بعقل محض و متحد مي شود بعقل فعال و عقل فعال مي شود بلکه عقل منفعل يعني نفس و خيال نمي ماند پس از ماده زايل مي شود و قوت و امکان از ان سلب ميشوند باقي مي مانند ببقاء لله سبحانه تعالى و بالجمله تحقيق اين مبحث و تنقيح آن ميسر نيست مگر براي کسي که عارف باشد کيفيت اتحاد نفس را بعقل فعال و عالم باشد کيفيت مصير اشياء را در مبداء متعال و ذلک فضل الله يوتيه من يشاء و بدانکه نشآءَت وجود متلاحق و متفاضل اند و باوجود تفاوت آنها بعض آنها متّصل ببعض اند و نهايت هر مرتبه بدائيت مرتبه ديگر است و آخر درجات اين نشآءَت تعليقيه اول درجات نشاء تجرديه است و در عالم تجرد محض حدوث و تغير و سنوح حالت نيست پس آن عالم بدخول نفس در آن متغير نميشود چنانچه بصدور نفس از ان متغير نمي شود و کما علمت في الفصل السابق پس ورود نفس بسوي آن عالم مثل صدور نفس است از ان عالم پس لازم است که تامل صادق و تفطن لائق کني در اين مطلب که در مقامات مختلفه بيان آن کرديم تا قلب تو منور گردد باشراق نور معرفت از عالم افاضه و الهام و الله يدعوا الى دار السلام.